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ABSTRACT
The energy sector faces a multitude of challenges related to climate change and energy
security. These challenges will likely prompt considerable changes in the coming
decades, including significant investment and new market design. To help fulfill multiple
goals and limit the necessary tradeoffs among them, industry and policymakers alike are
looking to new technologies. However, uncertainty regarding the challenges, the
solutions, and the behavior of the energy system, make it difficult to discern which
investment is right for what time.
This thesis reviews the potential changes in today's energy system and examines the
difficulties of addressing challenges that appear urgent yet elusive. An extensive
literature review considers the problems of clean energy investment decision-making in
modern energy systems, and evaluates the potential contributions of a real options
approach and system dynamics. A case study on the market growth of Gas-to-Liquids
technology provides more detail on the use of system dynamics to gauge market
uncertainties.
Admitting to the lack of appropriate tools to objectively evaluate strategies for tackling
today's energy challenges, this thesis helps answer why such questions as the appropriate
timing investment are so difficult to answer, and contentious. Ultimately, it suggests a
framework for considering the problem of clean energy investments under uncertainty. It
considers a real options approach and system dynamics, despite their limitations, as a
start for developing sophisticated tools to help grapple with investment uncertainties and
to create thoughtful, strategic plans.
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Title: Morton and Claire Goulder Family Professor
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Chapter 1: Preface and Overview
Rising concerns about energy security and climate change are prompting changes in
energy systems worldwide. But how should stakeholders react? Which type of
investments are appropriate, and at what times? Should stakeholders even attempt to
change course given the uncertainties about the timing and impact of climate change and
the uncertainty about the ability of various energy sources to meet our needs?
The original motivation for this thesis was to evaluate the advantages of early action to
address energy and environment concerns such as climate change. However, a literature
review of current challenges and approaches revealed that the question is difficult to
objectively assess in a quantitative manner. Disputes in the policy arena and varied
approaches by industry about the stringency and timing of action to address climate
change intimate such troubles. Under the premise that new tools might improve upon
current strategy, this thesis goes on to examine the benefits and limitations of a real
options approach and system dynamics. It concludes that these tools may be a good start
to addressing some of these issues and calls for more research on ways to apply them.
Having found limited information on the current strategic-planning tools in use, it also
suggests further research with industry and policymakers to learn more about the specific
tools and processes they use to strategize their policies and investments.
The second chapter of this thesis begins with an overview of climate change and energy
security and notes the approaches policymakers propose for addressing them. It
highlights the overlap and tension among the multiple goals policymakers seek and
observes the subsequent calls for investment in new technologies to limit potential
tradeoffs. In addition, Chapter 1 reviews the concerns that industry has regarding
balancing supply with demand in coming years, and their similar consideration of new
technology as a way to meet projected challenges.
Chapter 3 details the challenges of making investments to address energy concerns.
Specifically, it considers: How does one deal with a problem such as climate change that
is full of uncertainties? And how can one make the 'right' investments to address such
problems when the energy system is unpredictable and beyond the control of a single
actor?
Chapter 4 discusses potential approaches to answering the question, what is the cost of
delaying clean energy investments? It narrows the scope of the thesis to investments
made by industry.
The theory of real options and the modeling approach of system dynamics are potentially
useful tools to evaluate clean energy investment strategies. Chapter 5 reviews their
limitations and advantages for helping develop a strategy towards clean energy
investment strategy in the midst of uncertainty.
9
Chapter 6 reviews a case study of the use of system dynamics to analyze the potential
market growth around Gas-to-Liquids (GTL) technology. Further work on the model
could provide more insight about the use of system dynamics for understanding clean
energy investment problems from a business perspective. Chapter 7 then concludes with
a summary of previous chapters, and a note about further research.
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Chapter 2: Energy Challenges, Approaches, and Trends
According to Chevron Texaco, the world is "witnessing a new energy equation driven by
a number of factors," including increasing world demand, more challenging supplies, and
a "complex geopolitical environment" (Chevron Texaco 2004). Exxon Mobil also
believes significant changes are on the horizon, and that, "providing timely and adequate
supplies is a large scale, long-term challenge" (Exxon Mobil 2004). As governments
take action to address mounting concerns such as climate change and energy security, the
energy industry is also preparing to operate in a new environment. Both government and
industry are looking to new technologies to cope with supplying the growing demand that
fuels economic growth, while addressing global energy concerns.
Changing Policy Environment
From regional electricity blackouts to price spikes in international oil markets, and from
local air pollution to global climate change, the consequence of energy system
performance is pervasive. As of late, energy security and climate change have reached
the top of the agenda for many countries and corporations alike. Climate change has
been the focus of recent international discussions such as the Gleneagles G8 Summit of
2005, and major oil and gas industries have discussed climate change concerns in their
annual reports.' Government concerns over energy security and climate change are
prompting changes in public policy which affect the environment in which the energy
sector operates.
The discussions of climate change and energy security are familiar to many. To refresh
the minds of readers and point to emerging policy trends, the following details the
concerns, and policy approaches related to climate change and energy security.
Climate Change Definition
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) defines
climate change as:
a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity
that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to
natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods
(United Nations 2005).
Scientists have studied questions related to greenhouse warming for a century. The
institutional and socioeconomic issues, however, have come in focus only the last couple
of decades. Now the center of international debate via forums such as the UNFCCC or
the Kyoto Protocol, the call to action to mitigate and adapt to climate change has taken on
increasing urgency.
' For more detail, please see Chevron Texaco 2004, ExxonMobil 2004, Shell 2004 and G8 2005.
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As the impacts of climate change are wide-ranging and potentially catastrophic,
policymakers have a keen interest in mitigating climate change and its effects. The
energy industry has a central role in mitigating climate change, as fossil fuels, which
account for over half of total energy consumed worldwide, contribute the majority of
global C02 emissions. As the IPCC noted in its 2001 synthesis report for policymakers,
"Emissions of C02 due to fossil-fuel burning are virtually certain to be the dominant
influence on the trend of atmospheric C02 concentration during the 21st century" (IPCC
2001, 27).
Figure 1. World Total Energy Consumption and CO2 Emissions by Fuel (2002)
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Source: IEA 2005c, 28 and 44.
The following reviews potential effects caused by climate change as analyzed by
scientific experts.
Climate Change Impact
Since its establishment in 1988, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has
assessed the scientific, technical, and socioeconomic information regarding climate
change.2 According to its latest assessment, there is strong evidence that global warming
is occurring and that human activities have contributed to the warming observed over the
past fifty years. An increase in greenhouse gas emissions due to human activities has led
to a higher concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. This, in turn, has led to
a change in global average temperatures, as well as other climate changes.
Measurements indicate a 31 + 4 % increase in the atmospheric concentration of C02
from 1750 to 2000, and an increase in global mean surface temperature of about 0.6 +
0.2°C over the twentieth century (IPCC 2001). In addition, scientists have observed
other effects consistent with the theory on global warming, such as changes in sea level
and precipitation, and the retreat of glaciers. For example, scientists believe that over the
20th century, the global mean sea level has risen by about one to two millimeters per year.
2 According to the Principles Governing IPCC Work as mandated by the United Nations Environmental
Program and the World Meteorological Organization, "The role of the IPCC is to assess on a
comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical and socioeconomic
information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change, its
potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation." (IPCC 2003)
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Though there are uncertainties about the size of increase, the IPCC projects that
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations, global average surface temperature, and sea
levels will continue to rise.
The projected change in climate will likely have varying impacts by region, some
positive and negative. However, for most areas, the adverse impacts are likely to
overwhelm the beneficial ones. Furthermore, should the rate and extent of climate
change increase with greater cumulative emissions, the effect of negative impacts will
likely dominate everywhere. Climate change scientists expect an increase in extreme
weather events, and a change in climate variability. Scientists also note the possibility of
an increase in flooding, and in some areas increased drought and fire. The above
changes, along with regional changes in patterns of species and diseases could threaten
human health, biodiversity and ecological productivity (IPCC 2001). Local socio-
economic and environmental conditions, as well as actions taken to adapt to climate
change, will affect the impact and extent of damage. However, the potentially
irreversible damages due to climate change, such as the extinction of species and human
settlements lost to flooding and extreme storms and the threat to human quality of life,
make climate change a critical issue for policymakers. Though the above is not an
exhaustive list of the potential impacts of climate change, and though there are great
uncertainties about what the extent and location of potential impacts will be, it is clear
that the risks of the socioeconomic effects of climate change are high.
Approaches to Addressing Climate Change
154 nations and the European Community adopted the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change in 1992. It went into force in 1994 with 189 signatories.
The UNFCCC was the first agreement of its kind, urging international action to limit
greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs). Its ultimate objective is to stabilize the atmospheric
concentration of GHGs "at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system" (UNFCCC 1992). However, the UNFCCC sets no
mandatory target for what constitutes a dangerous GHG emissions concentration. The
Kyoto Protocol, which went into force in February of 2005, sets mandatory limit on the
GHGs of its signatories. This will require major adjustments to signatories' energy
systems. Other international agreements and dialogues such as the UNFCCC and G8
Summits are prompting action outside of the Kyoto Protocol. World leaders at the
Gleneagles G8 Summit, for example, vowed to make discussion and action on climate
change a top priority, regardless of their Kyoto commitments (G8 2005). Apart from the
mandatory or voluntary commitments to reduce GHG emissions, particular actions to do
so are generally unspecified. However, several experts have promoted theoretical
approaches and many countries have already taken action. While there are measures to
address emissions associated with agriculture, land-use changes and forestry, and waste
management, this paper will focus on energy-related policies.
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Figure 2. Kyoto Timeline
Source: Goldman Sachs 2004, 39.
Three general strategies for reducing GHG emissions related to energy include: 1)
increasing the use of energy sources alternative to fossil fuels; 2) reducing the carbon-
intensity of production; and 3) raising the energy efficiency of supply and demand
(Climate Change Secretariat 2004). Regardless of the approach taken, the goal of many
government policies is to decouple emissions increases with economic growth while
protecting the environment and ensuring energy security. Promoting energy efficiency is
a common strategy among actors due to its potential for multiple benefits, including cost
savings and demand management. However, developed and developing countries are
making use of the several techniques available to mitigate GHG emissions in multiple
sectors.
Common tools to address climate change include fiscal incentives and disincentives,
market mechanisms, voluntary agreements, regulation and standards, research and
development, and information and education. The focuses of these instruments span a
broad range of energy areas. For example, several policymakers have used economic
incentives to internalize the cost of carbon, and promote the use of alternatives. Such
measures include carbon taxes, reduction in fossil fuel subsidies, and tax credits and
accelerated depreciation for renewable energy sources and energy efficient products.
Market mechanisms developed in and among countries include carbon emissions trading,
such as the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme, and tradable
renewable energy credits, as implemented in some states in the U.S. While many policies
require mandatory action, voluntary and negotiated agreements are also in wide practice.
These have ranged from agreements to reduce energy consumption, conduct energy
audits, increase the efficiency of products, and engage in emissions trading. Regulations
and standards are also in effect to coordinate new technologies as well as encourage
prompt action. Policies in this area range from energy efficiency requirements and
production targets for renewable energy, to coordinating interconnection standards for
distributed generation or developing hydrogen safety standards. Research and
development is also an important initiative used to develop and reduce the costs of such
technologies as carbon sequestration. In addition, information and public awareness is
important to promoting the necessary changes in industry and amongst consumers to
mitigate climate change. Best practices and information sharing, public awareness
campaigns, and product labeling are such notable measures (Climate Change Secretariat
2004 and IEA 2005b).
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The above is not an exhaustive list but it illustrates the extent of activities being taken to
mitigate climate change. Numerous countries, at different stages in economic
development, are taking a range of actions. The focus of policy ranges from supply and
demand and from fossils fuels to alternatives. For example, the Philippines has passed an
Energy Plan to increase its renewable energy capacity, while France and Finland have
increased their nuclear power generation capacity with upgrades and new investments.
Some strategies involve "no regrets" measures, 3 while others assume a near-term cost
with the intention of long-run benefits from climate change mitigation. Overall, countries
are already making significant policy changes to their energy systems and a major
transformation to energy systems worldwide is on the horizon.
Energy Security Definition
Energy security is also a concern for policymakers and industry. Though it is a separate
issue from climate change, the two are both linked to energy resources, infrastructure,
and usage. In fact, the definition of energy security has changed over time, and is even
varied amongst its users today. Generally, it refers to the reliable and adequate supply of
energy at affordable prices. More broadly, it entails the timely management of world
energy resources. The following section highlights background significant to the issue,
and notes the expansion of the meaning of energy security from oil and import risk to
other types of energy and risks. It also discusses the integration of energy security with
goals of economic growth and environmental protection.
In the 1970's, the prime focus of energy security was access to oil and limiting import
risks. After the oil price shocks of 1973-1974, twenty-six nations took action to improve
their energy security by signing the Agreement on an International Energy Program
(IEP), which established the International Energy Agency (IEA). The main concern of
the treaty was oil supply and affordability. Its objectives were to "promote secure oil
supplies on reasonable and equitable terms," "take common effective measures to meet
oil supply emergencies," "promote co-operative relations with oil producing countries
and with other oil consuming countries", "play a more active role in relation to the oil
industry," and reduce their dependence on imported oil (United Nations 1974).
With the growing importance of electricity to energy systems and the rise in natural gas
use worldwide, energy security has evolved to encompass more than just oil and import
risks. According to the IEA, "Today, the term includes other types of energy, and risks
such as accidents, terrorism, under-investment in infrastructure and poorly designed
markets, all of which might curtail adequate supplies of energy at affordable prices" (EA
2002).
To facilitate the discussion of energy security, it helps to sort the issue by its two factors:
1) economic shortages due to market power and 2) actual shortages in supply. The
former is predominantly concerned with the concentration in energy markets and the
resulting price distortions, while the latter primarily relates to balancing supply and
3
'No regrets' strategies refer to actions whose benefits are greater than their cost, regardless of climate
change mitigation impact.
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demand in time. An economic shortage is when the market price of energy is set as if
energy were in short supply, when in actuality the supply is abundant (Greene and Ahmad
2005).
The Impact of Energy Security Failures
The majority of the world's proven oil reserves are geographically concentrated.
Because of this concentration, competitive markets may easily be hindered. The Oil
Embargo of 1973 proved just how much turmoil a key producer could create by limiting
production. Today, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), an
organization of eleven oil-exporting countries,4 accounts for almost forty percent of the
world's oil production and roughly two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves (EIA
2005b). OPEC's large production capacity allows it to heavily influence world oil prices,
which remains a concern for oil-importing nations.
Table 1. Oil Reserve Estimates by Geography
Rank Country Oil - Proved % of OPEC Middle
Reserves (bbl) World East
Total
World - 1.025 E 12 -
1 Saudi Arabia 2.617 E 11 26 i X
2 Canada 1.789 E 11 17
3 Iran 1.380E 11 13 X
4 Iraq 1.125 E 11 11 X
5 United Arab Emirates 9.780 E 10 10 X
6 Kuwait 9.650 E 10 9 X
7 Venezuela 7.800 E 10 8 i
8 Russia 6.900 E 10 7
9 Libya 3.800 E 10 4 
10 Nigeria 3.400 E 10 3 X
Note: Estimates established in 2004, Except for Russia, 2003 and World, 2002.
Source: Data from (CIA 2005).
Price spikes due to manipulation of market power are a serious threat to the energy
security of oil-dependent nations. For example, a 2005 report published by the Oak
Ridge National Laboratories estimates that for the United States, the cost of oil
dependence since the 1970's has accrued to $2.7-$4.7 trillion in constant 2000 dollars
(Greene and Ahmad 2005). The same report characterizes these losses as due to: transfer
of wealth, loss of potential GDP, and macroeconomic adjustment costs. The transfer of
wealth refers to the direct payment of dollars for oil, while the potential loss of GDP
refers to the loss in consumer and producer surplus by paying higher than competitive
prices. The macroeconomic adjustment cost relates to the underemployment in capital
4 OPEC Countries include: Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela (EIA 2005b).
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and labor due to slow adjustments in prices and wages from a price shock.5 In addition to
economic costs, a jump in oil prices can raise the cost of daily activities that rely on it,
incurring social costs and affecting quality of life.
Even without market manipulation, however, price spikes due to shortages in oil supply
can occur. Such disruptions are due to actual supply shortages versus the economic ones
described above. For example, many transportation and production disruptions can
occur, caused by factors such as social unrest or strikes. Though natural gas has never
experienced similar supply disruptions, imbalances between supply and demand have
caused price spikes before.
In fact, imbalance between supply and demand is a general energy security concern for
all types of energy. As the industrialized nations increase their use of digital
technologies, for example, electricity reliability is becoming an important factor in
energy security. For example, a 2003 blackout in the U.S. left 50 million people without
power for 36 hours, interrupted telecommunications, water, sewage services, costing
approximately $6.4 billion in economic activity (ELCON 2004).
Underinvestment, technical failures, and political instability, amongst other factors, can
disrupt the delicate balance between supply and demand, creating price shocks. Such
shocks can affect quality of life, and incur significant economic costs. Efforts to address
energy security require policies to address market imperfections or simply protect people
from the serious consequence of disrupted energy supply.
Policies for Addressing Energy Security
Oil-importing countries can protect themselves against market manipulation by reducing
the net price elasticity of demand for concentrated oil sources (Greene and Ahmad 2005).
Several provisions outlined in the Agreement on EP, which continue today, were
intended to do just that.6 Many also addressed disruptions due to real supply shortage, as
opposed to economic shortages. Additional steps, such as improving investment
conditions, specifically address market flaws to keep supply and demand in better
balance. The following outlines policies to promote energy security, according to their
focus area, many of which are relevant beyond oil security. Generally, these include
demand response, supply investment, reserve creation, diversity in fuel type and source,
and increasing transparency and information. Overall, increasing the flexibility in supply
and demand can increase the quick response and recovery from shortages and
breakdowns.
5 High energy prices increase input costs as energy is a component of all production and services. A
resulting increase in inflation can lower demand and create anticipation of higher interest rates, reducing
investment. A price shock that throws an economy out of equilibrium can result in underemployment of
both capital and labor, if rigidities in the market keep prices and wages from adjusting quickly.
6Such measures included: development of emergency reserves, fostering dialogue amongst producer and
consumer countries, creation of an international information system, development of long-term cooperative
efforts to promote energy conservation, the accelerated development of alternative energy sources, and
research and development (United Nations, 1974).
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Institutional preparation is one tactic to prepare for the long-run. Dialogue with producer
countries is intended to foster an understanding between players in the market.
Emergency strategies to allocate scarce supplies where they are needed are critical to
ensuring quick and seamless short-term responses to disruptions. Demand response is
another critical tactic to react to energy disruptions. Investment in energy efficiency of
consumption can be a powerful tool. Reserve supplies, such as the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve for oil or spinning reserves for electric power, can tide over critical demand in
the short-run. Information systems that monitor energy markets can be a way to warn of
imminent imbalances between supply and demand. Increasing the reliability and
timeliness of data can make warning systems more effective. Investment is a critical task
to ensuring energy security. Encouraging a favorable investment climate to ensure
adequate infrastructure and capacity is a basic requirement for any energy market.
Diversifying investments by location and fuel type, and developing cost-competitive
substitutes, can reduce the impact of price changes in a fuel source.
Overall, energy security is a significant concern for many countries. Policies to improve
energy security seek to affect investment and improve the operation of market. This
potentially creates significant changes for participants in the energy markets. A quote
from an EA document on energy security nicely summarizes:
The principal methodfor assuring dependable supplies is fostering adequate
resource development by a diverse group of suppliers through the creation of
efficient markets, undistorted pricing, secure frameworks for investment and
transparent relations between consumers and suppliers. This is backed up by
emergency response measures (IEA 2002, 3).
Policy Overlap and Tensions
Though energy security and climate change are distinct issues, they are intimately related
because of their mutual concern with energy use and supply. A sophisticated view of
energy systems acknowledges the impact that it has on multiple socioeconomic and
environmental goals. Over the years, countries have begun to take an 'integrated
approach' to energy, harmonizing their agendas with broad-looking policies. The
Comminiqu6 from the Gleneagles G8 Summit highlights this trend:
We will act with resolve and urgency now to meet our shared and multiple
objectives of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, improving global environment,
enhancing energy security and cutting air pollution in conjunction with our
vigorous efforts to reduce poverty (G8 2005).
A look at national energy policies, and the EA's Shared Goals adopted in 1993,
reinforces the evidence. However, as much harmony as some policies have managed,
necessary tradeoff amongst goals are likely to be inevitable. Additional international
development commitments add to the challenge of balancing multiple objectives. The
following considers the overlap in approaches to climate change and energy security,
noting the sustainability goals of countries taking integrated approaches. In addition, it
7 Please see Appendix I for a copy of the EA Shared Goals.
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examines the challenges to achieving multiple goals. Finally, it discusses the differences
in strategies to highlight the impending tradeoffs.
Synergies of Integrated Approaches
The general strategy for mitigating climate change, at its most basic, is to increase the use
of alternative energy sources, reduce the carbon-intensity of production, and increase
energy efficiency. In addition, energy security seeks to balance supply and demand such
that supplies are adequate, reliable, and cost-effective. Many options can help meet these
multiple objectives and balance the needs for energy security, environmental protection,
and economic development. Carbon capture and storage technology, for example, could
permit the continued use of fossil fuels while cutting their GHG emissions. Because
fossil fuels currently account for the largest share of energy consumption in the world,
their continued use is a significant factor in maintaining the use of affordable supply. As
noted earlier, increased use of other less carbon-intensive energy sources can also reduce
emissions while enhancing energy security. Domestic low-carbon sources such as
nuclear power, renewables, and natural gas, for example can reduce import dependence
and diversify demand. In addition, energy efficiency of supply and consumption can
increase energy intensity, lowering operation costs and emissions for the same output.
International development agencies are also looking to integrate approaches for economic
development and the environment. The United Nations' Millennium Development
Goals, adopted in 2000 by the General Assembly, for example, seeks to simultaneously
reduce poverty, and improve health, education, and environment among other things.8 To
balance economic development, security, and environmental goals, many of such
initiatives are looking to approaches similar as those described above. The World Bank,
for example, is poised to increase its annual lending commitments for energy efficiency
and renewable energy projects by 20% per year, from 2005 to 2010 (World Bank Group
2004).
Development Goals
Development initiatives are strongly tied to energy as the access to reliable energy
sources can improve quality of life and increase economic productivity. Benefits range
from improving sanitation, education, and working conditions to providing relief from
chores, access to information, and increasing mobility. The environmental, health, and
economic aspects of energy usage make it a key part of international development
initiatives. As the IEA notes:
Energy is a prerequisite to economic development. The prosperity that economic
development brings, in turn, stimulates demand for more and better energy
services (EA 2005d, 35).
While total and per capita energy consumption in developing countries is lower than that
of industrialized nations, per capital energy consumption is likely to rise with economic
development. Population growth will likely also contribute to a rise in developing
countries' total energy consumption. A rise in energy consumption causes serious
8For more a more detailed description of the goals, please visit http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
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concern about an increase in GHG emissions. Compatibility between the two goals of
energy security and climate change reduction will depend on the availability and
attractiveness of non-carbon-intensive energy sources, and the priorities of developing
nations. Fossil fuels, however, tend to be available and more economically attractive
than other options. China, for example, was already the world's second largest emitter of
greenhouse gases in 2000 (Marland et al 2005), and its fossil fuel consumption continues
to rise (BP 2005). The potential for future economic growth along with a heavy reliance
on fossil fuels means developing countries could significantly contribute to global GHG
emissions. The following EIA statistic highlights, though somewhat exaggerates, the
cause for concern. If the world emitted carbon at the same per capita levels as
industrialized countries, total carbon dioxide emissions in 2001 would have been 3.5
times greater than they were (EIA 2004b). 9 The effort to reduce poverty and permit
economic expansion, while curbing emissions is a tenuous one.
The availability and use of cost-competitive alternative sources and energy efficiency
could relieve this tension. However, the technologies are generally either not yet
available or have not yet been adopted.
A concerted global effort to drive down the costs of low carbon technologies
would allow continued poverty reduction without excessive increases in
greenhouse gas emissions in the medium or long term. We are, however, a long
way from this reality (UK 2004, 25).
While it is not clear if government initiatives to prompt energy expansion in development
countries will succeed,1 ° the desire to promote economic growth while curbing emissions
may be a significant tension if the technologies considered are not considered cost-
effective by developing nations. The choice and timing of technology investment is at
the crux of the problem. Whether countries will wait for technologies to progress or
continue with the best available resources as soon as possible, regardless of carbon
content, remains to be seen.
9 Per capita energy consumption in developing countries is actually significantly lower than developed
countries (EIA 2004b).
10 Many of the world's poorest countries have yet to start the cycle of energy infrastructure development
and economic growth.
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Table 2. Policy Goal Descriptions, Overlaps, & Tensions
ISSUES
Climate Change Energy Security Development
Reduce GHG Emissions Associated Provide Reliable & Adequate Improve Health, Education,
with Energy Demand and Supply Supply of Energy at Affordable and Environment
Prices
· Promote Alternative Energy . Facilitate Demand Response · Develop Energy
Sources · Inc & Diversify Supply Infrastructure to
· Increase Energy Efficiency Investments Improve Quality and
. Reduce Carbon Intensity of . Reduce Import Dependence Capacity
Fossil Fuels . Prepare Emergency · Identify and Promote
Responses Energy Uses to Aid
Economic Growth
Goals
OVERLAPS
. Energy Efficiency: reduces consumption for the same output, thus lowering operation costs and
emissions
. Renewable Energy: domestic, cost-effective alternatives to fossils can cut emissions and reduce
import reliance
. Carbon Capture and Sequestration: permits continued use of fossils to meet supply needs while
limiting emissions
. Technology Transfer: reduce fossil fuel consumption in developing countries and limit
emissions or potential competition over fossil fuels.
TENSIONS
Challenges
* Develop supply in time to meet growing demand, while mitigating the environmental
consequences of production and consumption.
* Providing the energy necessary for developing countries to grow their economies and meet
their basic needs, while limiting resulting emissions and avoiding competition over potential
supply shortages.
Tradeoff
* Shift to new technologies if and only when they meet the same performance criteria and
become cost-competitive with current applications, and risk the consequence of continued
emissions, OR
* Motivate earlier change to address climate change by internalizing the cost of carbon before
the new and old technologies converge, and bear the potential costs to economic growth and
energy security.
The Difficulty of Integrated Approaches
While many of the suggested integrated approaches are feasible ways to meet multiple
objectives, many of them face short- to mid-term challenges. Fossil fuels have supplied
the majority of global energy consumption for decades. They currently tend to be less
expensive than alternative sources. As a 2004 UK policy document notes:
The tension between ever increasing dependence on fossil energy and the urgent
need to reduce world greenhouse gas emissions presents a major challenge for
policy makers considering long term energy security (UK 2004, 14).
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Though fossils have reliability and safety concerns, so do their alternatives. Many are
familiar with the environmental and security concerns of nuclear power. Most renewable
sources currently provide limited capacity, are difficult to integrate with traditional power
sources due to their intermittency, or have costs that affect their adequate supply at cost-
competitive prices. Hydrogen, an innovative energy carrier that may some day be
produced by carbon-free methods, would likely increase GHG emissions in the short-
term because its conversion process is inefficient and non-fossil production is too pricey.
Furthermore, safety issues need to be resolved. Much more development is needed to
address the above concerns with fossil fuel alternatives.
In addition, fossil-enabling technologies are also expensive and have safety concerns.
Carbon capture and sequestration, for example, is still deemed too expensive in many
cases, and there is concern about its long-term reliability and environmental side-effects.
Natural gas is a less carbon-intense source than oil. While advanced liquid natural gas
(LNG) technologies have reduced the cost of transport, the market is still developing. " 
Many policymakers are looking to advanced technologies and research and development
to solve these issues. EA noted the important role of new technologies when they
developed their Share Goals in 1993.
Continued research, development and market deployment of new and improved
energy technologies make a critical contribution to achieving the objectives
outlined above. Energy technology policies should complement broader energy
policies. International co-operation in the development and dissemination of
energy technologies, including industry participation and co-operation with non-
Member countries, should be encouraged (IEA Ministers 1993).
Summary
Despite very different origins of the challenges with energy security and climate change,
emerging policies to address them have a significant overlap. This is not that surprising,
however, given that several of the earliest policies to address energy security and
environmental concerns were 'no regrets' strategies.12 Many countries have also
recognized the interconnection between energy and other national goals, and are aiming
to take integrated approaches. However, in these same plans, countries seem to rely on
technological developments to widen their options and meet multiple policy goals while
limiting the tradeoffs among them. World leaders at the G8 Evian Summit of 2003, for
example, promoted international collaboration on the research and development of new
energy technologies to provide energy security and mitigate climate change (G8 2003).
The fact that many new technologies are not cost competitive with conventional
applications creates a tension amongst these potentially divergent goals. Countries want
to assist development goals, for example, but would like to slow demand enough so
supply can keep up. Rapid growth rates mean potential competition over resources
1 l More detail about the growth of natural gas markets follow below.
12 'No regrets' strategies refer to actions whose benefits are greater than their cost, regardless of climate
change mitigation impact.
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scarce in the short- to mid-term. Concerns over climate change add another constraint on
the goal of economic growth. The energy system is large and complex, and poses many
challenges to governments. Many governments would like to see a global free market
supporting their energy needs. However, they are also increasingly concerned about
market externalities such as climate change and energy security, and are shifting and
developing new policies to shape the market to meet its needs.
Energy System Trends and Industry
Apart from a changing political environment in response to climate change and energy
security concerns, energy systems will have to cope with changes in supply and demand.
Demand is growing, and industry and energy experts project that it will continue at a
rapid rate. Supply is also changing. Markets are becoming increasingly global and
longer distances in travel are required. In addition, industry is looking to develop fields
in new regions and of new types. Meeting rapid demand growth with adequate supply is
a challenge for industry, which is looking to new investments and technologies to help.
Demand
A surge in demand from developing countries like China and India has prompted concern
about the potential for future rapid demand growth. The IEA projects that if current
trends hold, energy demand will increase sixty percent by 2030 (IEA 2005d). Exxon and
Shell, among other energy companies, are preparing to meet what they call a significant
challenge. ExxonMobil noted in a 2004 report, "Developing reliable, affordable supplies
to meet this energy demand will be an enormous challenge" (ExxonMobil 2004a).
Population growth and concerted efforts to improve access to energy and expand
economies contribute to the expectation that demand will rise at unprecedented rates.
World population growth has been rapid over the years, and will likely continue to rise
for the foreseeable future. According to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): "The
planet's population continues to explode: from 1 billion in 1820, to 2 billion in 1930, 3
billion in 1960, 4 billion in 1974, 5 billion in 1988, and 6 billion in 2000" (CIA 2005).
In addition, several developing parts of the world have recently experienced sharp
economic growth. According to a 2004 US Energy Information Agency (EIA) report, the
gross domestic product (GDP) of developing countries in Asia nearly quadrupled
between 1980 and 2001, outpacing the rest of the world. 13 In addition, CIA World
Factbook numbers on economic output give a sense of the economic growth in some
developing countries. Though global output rose by 4.9% in 2004, the output of China,
Russia, and India rose by 9.1%, 6.7%, and 6.2%, respectively (CIA 2005).
13Note: Developing Asia includes: Afghanistan; American Samoa; Bangladesh; Burma; Solomon Islands;
Bhutan; Brunei; Cambodia; Sri Lanka; China; Cook Islands; Fiji; French Polynesia; Guam; Hong Kong;
Hawaiian Trade Zone; Indonesia; India; U.S. Pacific Islands; Korea, North; Kiribati; Korea, South; Laos;
Macau; Mongolia; Maldives; Malaysia; New Caledonia; Niue; Vanuatu; Nepal; Nauru; Pakistan; Papua
New Guinea; Philippines; Samoa; Singapore; Thailand; Tonga; Taiwan; Vietnam; Wake Island (EIA
2004b).
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Fossil fuels have been the predominant provider of energy throughout the world, though
it has fallen somewhat overtime (please see Figure 3). Energy companies expect that
increased demand for energy will most likely be met, at least initially, by fossil fuels
because of their ease of use and low cost. For example, the predominant fuels for
transportation, around the world, are petroleum-based. Though per capita sales of motor
vehicles in developing countries remain low, it is on the rise in rapidly growing regions
like China and India. According to the EIA, "... more cars were sold in China in 2001
than in four of seven G-7 countries. This has large implications for world energy use and
carbon dioxide emissions trends." In addition, fossil fuels accounted for 60% of
electricity generation in OECD countries. Non-OECD countries are even more
dependent on fossil fuels for electricity generation (EIA 2004b).
While developing countries tend to consumer at lower per capita rates than industrialized
nations, economic growth in developing countries and population growth worldwide
increase expectations that fossil fuel consumption around the world will rise. This
expectation has significant implications for suppliers. According to a 2004 ExxonMobil
report, industry will need to add about 80% of today's production in 10 years, in order to
meet demand. 
Figure 3. The Share of Fossil Fuels in World Energy Consumption (1980-2003)
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Source: Calculated with Energy Information Agency 2005 data (EIA 2005a, tables 1-4).
14 ExxonMobil, "A Report on Energy Trends, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Alternative Energy."
February, 2004 Exxon Mobil Report
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Supply
While forecasts are limited in their ability to predict the future, they often represent
trends and can often spur activity. 15 In the short-term, companies are looking to promote
energy efficiency in both supply and demand to extend the lives of existing resources. In
the long-term, however, the energy industry is looking to increase production of fossil
fuels to meet the expected demand growth. Many are already preparing to develop new
resources as well. For example, ExxonMobil's Senior Vice President, Rex Tillerson,
noted his company's increased investment in resource development over the years, during
a presentation at the Goldman Sachs' 2004 Global Energy Conference:
Capital investment has tripled since the merger (1999). This increase in
resource development activity is providing the replacement for production
volumes lost to normalfield decline in our existing producing areas, as well as
the source for volume growth in the future (Tillerson 2004).
Fossil fuels continue to be the preferred area of investment for energy companies,
regardless of their view of its long-term profitability in a carbon-constrained world.
Royal Dutch Shell plc has the most invested in renewables as compared to other major
energy companies. However, current investments are minor when compared to overall
operations. The predominant argument for stronger investment in fossils as compared to
renewables this is that supply from renewables could not feasibly meet demand. In a
2004 report, Shell noted, "the continued reliance on fossil fuels is mainly because other
energy sources will not be available on a large enough scale over the next 20 years"
(Shell 2004, 12). Exxon Mobil, in a 2004 report, explained their preference for R&D
over investment was due to the insufficient return on investment (Exxon Mobil, 2004a).
Trends and Challenges
The continued production of fossil fuels to meet supply, however, poses its own
challenges for the long-term. First, the scale of investments to meet demand growth is
unprecedented. In addition, many energy companies expect to shift production from
conventional resources to non-conventional. For example, during the same presentation
as noted above, ExxonMobil Senior Vice President noted:
In 2003, conventional resource developments represented 80% of our volumes.
... But, volume from emerging and development technologies more than double
by contribution in 2010, with substantial growth in deepwater, arctic, and LNG
(Tillerson 2004).
Finally, several of the areas where new production is planned, is in new areas under
different political regimes and with harsh physical environments. Both trends to shift the
physical and the geographic profiles of fossil fuel production pose new challenges. Harsh
environments require technological breakthroughs to ensure stable supply at adequate
costs, and non-conventional resources require novel approaches for extraction.
ExxonMobil is relying on new technologies to be able to extend their production:
15 For more discussion on forecasts, please see Chapter 2
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New technologies will likely continue to extend the recoverable resource base,
making additional - but currently uneconomical - conventional and
unconventional resources commercially attractive (Tillerson 2004).
The Growth of Natural Gas
The natural gas market has been growing as of late, and companies are keen to make
investments in this area. Technological breakthroughs have increased access and lowered
production and distribution costs. In addition, its flexibility of fuel uses, such as for
transportation or power generation, its abundance in reserves, and its lower carbon-
intensity of combustion' 6 make it a very attractive energy source. Increased growth in
natural gas demand and long distances between demand and supplies contribute to
people's expectations that natural gas will grow into a global market.
Currently, natural gas markets are isolated. However, changes in pricing mechanisms
such as shorter contracts, have increased flexibility and encouraged global trade (EIA
2004a and EIA 2003). Global natural gas consumption has increased significantly in
recent years. In 2004, consumption grew by 3.3 percent, as compared to 2.3% average in
the past 10 years (BP 2005). International trade of natural gas has increased too.
According to an EIA report on LNG, pipeline exports of natural gas grew forty-six
percent from 1995 to 2002. In addition, trade in LNG increased by sixty-two percent.
While markets have much further to go to fully liberalize, companies are already making
investments, especially in the area of LNG. In 2003, fifty-five of the world's 151 LNG
tankers were under construction (EIA 2003). A 2004 report by Goldman Sachs estimates
that recent plans announced by the industry could double current global capacity in LNG
by 2007 (Goldman Sachs 2004). Figure 4 displays a map of LNG and Gas-to-Liquids
(GTL) investment projects. GTL technology, a proven technology that converts natural
gas to low-sulfur diesel fuel could also accelerate the consumption of natural gas.
16 Natural gas emits twenty-five percent fewer carbon emissions than oil, and fifty-percent less than coal
(Goldman Sachs 2004, 16).
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Figure 4. LNG & GTL Investment Projects
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The Problem of Climate Change
Increasing supply in time to meet demand is challenging on its own. However, the added
constraint of minimizing GHG emissions makes it a daunting task. The issue of climate
change affects the energy industry in several ways. An increase in harsh weather
conditions in certain areas could affect the cost and reliability of production and
distribution. An increase in volatile weather conditions in the Gulf of Mexico has already
impacted drilling operations (Goldman Sachs 2004).
Regardless of physical damages, government attempts to internalize the cost of carbon
emissions, could dramatically affect demand profiles or supply costs. The GHG
emissions associated with energy companies are significant (please see Figure 5), and
cutting them could be costly. The Carbon Disclosure Project estimates that the costs of
Oil and Gas Industry to cut its emission by 10% below 2001 levels could range from
0.4% to 2.5% of annual cash flow (Goldman Sachs 2004, 50).17 In addition, as energy
production represents only 10% of total GHG emissions, steps throughout the supply
chain must be made to reduce emissions in the long-run (Goldman Sachs 2004, 41).
17 Note: The cost of carbon reductions depends on many factors, including the market price of emissions.
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Figure 5. Absolute Emissions of Major Oil & Natural Gas Companies
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While energy companies are looking to meet growing demand with fossil fuels, the
carbon-intensive nature of their production, distribution and, use is problematic (please
see Figure 6). The trend towards an increase in non-conventional sources may contribute
to the problem. Heavy oils, for example, provide significant amounts of recoverable
reserve, and may help to geographically diversify sources. Canada and Venezuela's
recoverable heavy oil reserves, for example, are similar in size to Saudi Arabia's
conventional reserves (Holditch 2003). However, they are very carbon-intensive. The
above, though not an exhaustive assessment, illustrates the potential tension that future
reserves may pose.
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The challenge of increasing supply in a timely manner to meet demand is significant.
However, impending efforts to internalize the cost of carbon may make the current
approach that industry is taking, more difficult. Furthermore, the uncertainty of when
such a change may occur makes investment tricky. Industry may soon find itself in the
middle of political tensions over the desire to both meet energy security goals while
mitigating the causes of climate change.
Summary
While energy experts and industry alike believe that energy reserves are sufficient to
meet demand in the coming decades, both note that securely meeting demand in a timely,
cost-effective manner will likely be a long-term challenge. According to Chevron,
"'Energy will be one of the defining issues of this century, and one thing is clear: the era
of easy oil is over."'8
Energy companies are bracing themselves for massive investment to increase supply, and
are looking to new technologies to help. Many have started efforts to increase efficiency,
boost production, and develop new techniques to extend current resources and access
new ones. Fossil fuels expansion, especially in natural gas, is currently the focus of their
efforts, and they are relying on technology to help meet long-term needs. Overall, the
market is experiencing serious change, including a shifting geographic and physical
18 Chevron, 2005, Will You Join Us Campaign. Information available online at
http://www. wlllyouioinus.com/
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composition for fossils, potentially a more global market. While there is a trend towards
an increasingly diverse mix of increased renewables, natural gas, and alternative
petroleum sources, traditional fossil fuels currently dominate the mix.
The challenge for meeting demand may be difficult in its own right. However, concerns
over climate change may significantly impact demand profiles, and thus the return on
investments. Its impact is already noticeable, with the increase in demand and supply of
natural gas. As Shell noted in its 2004 report on sustainability:
... both meeting the energy supply challenge andfirst slowing, and then
eventually reversing, the rise in carbon emissions will remain a major challenge
for energy producers and users alike (Shell 2004, 9).
Similar to policymakers, industry is also looking for technologies to help them meet the
challenges they face in a changing world of energy.
Conclusion
The energy system is complex, far-reaching, and poses many challenges to governments
and industry alike. Issues of climate change, energy security, and economic development
have been of growing concern for policymakers worldwide. Because policies to address
each overlap, they cannot be thought of in isolation. In light of this, many policymakers
seek integrated approaches. However, there are also likely tradeoffs among goals. For
example, providing the energy necessary for developing countries to grow their
economies and meet their basic needs, while limiting resulting emissions and avoiding
competition over potential supply shortages, will be a challenge. Policymakers are thus
looking to technological advances in fossil fuel and renewable energy production,
distribution, and use to limit these tradeoffs and unify goals.
In addition, the energy market is experiencing significant change, including a shifting
geographic and physical composition of fossil fuel resources and a potentially more
global competitive market. While there is a trend towards an increasingly diverse mix of
increased renewables, natural gas, and alternative petroleum sources, traditional fossil
fuels currently dominate the mix and may continue to do so for the foreseeable future.
As such, energy companies are bracing themselves for massive changes, including a need
to invest to increase supply. The challenge for meeting demand may be difficult in its
own right. However, concerns over climate change may significantly impact demand
profiles, and thus the return on investments. Like policymakers, they too are looking to
new technologies to help.
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Chapter 3: The Difficulty of Investment
Introduction
Changes in the energy system are on the horizon, and some of the investments to fulfill
that change are already being made. However, several aspects of the energy system make
investments challenging. Any investment faces risk, such as operational or market risk,
due to technical and socio-economic factors. However, uncertainties make decisive
action difficult, from both a public policy and private investment perspective.
This chapter examines the difficulty of making clean energy investments in a changing
energy system. It briefly highlights some usual risks that deter investment and are
significant to energy, those related to price and regulation. It also elaborates on some of
the uncertainties regarding energy security and climate change that can affect investment
environments. Furthermore, it discusses the tradeoffs that must be made in the face of
uncertainty, provides a brief summary on problems of valuing costs and benefits of
actions, and outlines theories and examples of disputes over the correct course of action.
Uncertainties make it difficult to justify actions, let alone develop appropriate strategies.
Examples of divergent corporate strategies also highlight the difficulty of addressing
energy challenges. Finally, the chapter concludes with an examination of why traditional
strategy of building to the forecast is unsatisfactory.
Energy security and climate change are shrouded by large uncertainties, and unforeseen
events can lead to startling and catastrophic events. Addressing the potential threats of
climate change and energy security rely on long-term planning. However, uncertainties
make the costs and benefits of action unclear. This in turn affects stakeholders' ability to
justify action and develop solutions that optimize present and future returns. Traditional
strategies, like building to the forecast, are no longer effective so creating and coping
with changes is so difficult.
Investment Risks
Private investment is an important component of the global energy system. Most of the
non-OPEC countries have private oil sectors (EIA 2005), and a rush of deregulation in
electricity and natural gas markets around the globe has increased the role of the private
investment in these areas as well. While industry is responsible for a significant portion
of the necessary investments to ensure the reliable and adequate supply of energy for
consumers, they invest on the basis of economic returns. Investments in the energy
sector may yield large returns, but determining the appropriate timing and choices can be
a tricky. Market risks, including price levels and volatility, and regulatory risks,
regarding environmental regulation and market design, are particularly thorny.
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Price Risk
Investors in any market must deal with price risk, which affects their ability to ensure a
sufficient return on investment within a reasonable period. Because investments in the
energy sector are typically long-lived and capital intensive, price risk is a rather
significant factor in investment. Low prices can deter investment in energy supply.
However, price volatility is also a significant factor for energy investors. While the
expected growth in demand is encouraging new investments in supply, if demand rises
faster than supply, the market might experience severe price shocks. Though an increase
in supply generally encourages more investment, price volatility can pose a threat to
investment.
A 2001 regression analysis done by IEA, noted that an increase in oil price volatility is
associated with a decline in investments by the oil industry. They explain that an
increase in price volatility can reduce the willingness of people to invest, due to a
perceived increase in the uncertainty of future returns. With higher risk premiums,
energy companies may be dissuaded from investment, thus exacerbating the problem of
shortage supplies. As the authors state:
Bearing in mind the very capital-intensive nature of the energy industry, the
mutually reinforcing volatility effects may have a significantly adverse impact on
oil supply due to the increase in the rate of return demanded by the source of
capital (IEA 2001, 15).
Resulting high prices from supply-demand imbalances will likely help to curb demand.
However, rigidities in the market, such as the transportation sector's large dependence on
oil, make the prospects of delays in change and subsequent economic and social costs
during imbalance likely.
Regulatory Risk
Given the long-term, large-scale nature of required investments, investors would like to
assure that they receive sufficient returns. Fostering good working relationships with
host countries is a key component of this. Private investments are also of interest to
policymakers because of the energy security and environmental implications of their
choices. Political stability and transparency in emerging markets helps cultivate investor
confidence. Internalizing externalities is another way policymakers can assist. However,
political instability, or inability to reach consensus on a long-term policy framework can
impede private investment by increasing the chance that investments become stranded,
and lower expected returns. This in turn can add to financing costs. Industry's expansion
of production to new areas may also incur political challenges. Restrictions on foreign
direct investment, for example, pose a challenge to developing resources.
The issues of climate change and energy security are difficult on their own. Economic
and scientific uncertainties about climate change and energy security make valuation of
when and how to respond to or preempt climate change difficult. However, political
confusion in addressing these issues may also add to the challenge for investors, if such
debate affects regulatory stability. Because private investment accounts for a significant
portion of the energy system, the need to balance fostering private investment while
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correcting for market externalities is an important one for policymakers. Further
discussion on the challenge of developing appropriate strategies, for industry and
policymakers, follows below. First, a brief discussion of uncertainties in climate change
and energy security leads into why such decisions may be difficult.
Scientific and Economic Uncertainties of Climate Change and
Energy Security
The following details some of the current uncertainties regarding climate change and
energy security. Both the impacts and possibility of failures in energy security and
existence of climate change remain uncertain.
Climate Change Uncertainties
The existence of climate change and its potential for damage is generally agreed upon.
However, the details of its causation and impact remain elusive. While further research
and development may resolve uncertainties in the near-term, the complexity of the
Earth's climate system means that uncertainties will likely remain. As a 2005 joint
statement by eleven national academies states: "There will always be uncertainty in
understanding a system as complex as the world's climate" (National Academies' Joint
Statement 2005).
Despite a general recognitions that the average global temperature is warming and
anthropogenic emissions is in part responsible, the causation and potential for future
climate change is as of yet unclear in many regards. For example, scientists cannot
specify the sensitivity of climate change to emission concentrations. As the IPCC noted
in their 2001 Assessment, "There is a wide band of uncertainty in the amount of warming
that would result from any stabilized greenhouse gas concentration" (IPCC 2001, 19).
Also, while the uncertainties regarding radiative forcing from anthropogenic GHG are
small, the indirect effects of aerosols on clouds are not well quantified. Furthermore, the
existence and strength of climate feedback mechanisms is vague. Experts believe that
large-scale, abrupt, non-linear changes in the climate are quite possible. However, the
particular mechanisms, and thus the time-scales, and likelihood are unclear. The
irreversibility of such effects is currently indeterminate too. The IPCC notes that:
Some of the projected abruption/non-linear changes in physical systems and in
the natural sources and sinks of greenhouse gases could be irreversible, but
there is an incomplete understanding of some of the underlying processes
(IPCC 2001, 14).
The uncertainty regarding the magnitude and nature of natural climate variability also
obscures understanding about the ultimate effect the anthropogenic contribution to
emissions concentration will have. Finally, the regional trends in climate change are also
difficult to estimate.
In addition, the impact and mitigation costs of climate change are highly uncertain.
Currently, scientists have a limited ability to produce reliable details of local and regional
climate change projections. For example, the probability distributions of temperatures
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and sea-level projections are unsure. This makes assessing the economic impact of
climate change difficult. Assessments are also imprecise as they rely on a number of
assumptions. Integrated assessment models, for example, require predicting society's
response to climate change, and developing estimates or scenarios for technological
development, economic growth, and population growth, amongst a multitude of other
variable factors. In addition, a short period of history offers only a limited set of data to
study the correlation between economic activity and climate change. William D.
Nordhaus, a prominent economist from Yale University who has extensive experience
researching climate change, has noted the difficulty of modeling the impacts of climate
change. In a 2000 book, with co-author Joseph Boyer, he observed:
In reviewing current research, it is clear that the results are highly conjectural
and that it continues to be difficult to make solid estimates of the impacts of
climate change (Nordhaus & Boyer 2000, 69).
Overall, there is agreement in the scientific community that anthropogenic emissions are
on the rise and that they contribute to the presently noted phenomenon of global climate
change. However, the complexity of the issues, and the assumptions they require for
analysis, makes assessing the extent of climate change a grueling task. Despite continued
research, a number of uncertainties regarding the extent, and the environmental and
economic impacts of climate change, remain. Many believe that the complicated nature
of the issue will prevent us from being able to resolve such uncertainties before the
consequences are realized.
Energy Security Uncertainties
As noted earlier climate change is linked to other energy objectives such as energy
security. Uncertainties in energy security affect actions for climate change. For example,
the challenges of one issue may affect the desirability to invest in the market in general.
Also it may be difficult to develop integrated strategies if it is not clear how strong or
weak the tensions and overlaps between goals are. The following highlights some of the
uncertainties regarding energy security in terms of its consequences and the potential for
problems, focusing on reserve estimates and estimates of the cost to the economy.
Reserve Estimates
The question of global energy supply is a controversial one. The issue of energy supply
is contentious because there are many uncertainties regarding reserve estimation for fossil
fuels, today's predominant global energy source. The topic of oil supply is particularly
intense. For years, and to this day, pundits have disputed the day when oil will run out.
A 2001 USGS report on reserve growth noted: "Assessments of the remaining oil and gas
potential of the United States and the world are strongly affected by the assessor's models
and forecasts of future reserve growth" (Schmoker & Verma 2001, 1). Historically.
industry and governments have underestimated the reserve sizes for fossil fuels. Figure 7
shows the variation in estimates of the world's ultimate oil recovery since 1942.19
According to the same authors, the trend of increasing ultimate recovery estimates over
time "is primarily due to increases in the quantity and quality of geological, geophysical,
9 Ultimate recovery refers to proven reserves plus past production.
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and reservoir engineering information, and to the development of more rigorous
estimation methodologies" (Wood et al 2000, Slide 9).
New technologies are also able to boost the efficiency of production, increase access to
new areas, and lower costs, opening up previously non-conventional or uneconomic
sources. This unforeseen 'expansion' of sources due to technological progress also
aggravates the dispute, as innovation is unpredictable. Some worry whether innovation
and deployment of new technologies will occur in the appropriate lead-time to prevent
demand-supply imbalances. Adequate access to economic reserves and production
capacity is critical to maintaining balance between supply and demand, and preventing
price spikes. Technological progress in alternative energy sources is also uncertain, and
helps determines the overall cost-effectiveness and availability of supply.
Figure 7. Estimates of World Oil Ultimate Recovery
Published Estimates of World Oil Ultimate Recovery
I
I
.= - !.!i ;j:; ~,!-
l
U
0.5
MM
1 1.5 2 2.5
Trillions of Barrels
Source: Wood et al 2000, Slide 9.
Price Impact
Generally, it is difficult to estimate the affect of energy security failures on the economy,
because it is hard to distinguish their affect from of all the other factors that influence
economic performance. The same ORNL study referenced in Chapter 2, that estimated
the cost of oil price spikes to the US economy, states that deriving such numbers is a
difficult task. In particular, they note that uncertainty about the key parameters impedes
accuracy.
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Tradeoffs, and Valuation and Justification Difficulties
Developing supply in time to meet growing demand, while mitigating the environmental
consequences of production and consumption, is a serious challenge for businesses and
policymakers alike. In the midst of uncertainties about energy security and climate
change, stakeholders must balance the need to continue with investments in the face of
uncertainty, with the desire to wait for new information or technological developments to
mitigate the change of missteps. Ideally, one would consider the costs and advantages of
delaying investments in clean energy technologies. However, scientific and economic
uncertainties, and differences in the valuation of options, make this question difficult to
answer. The fact that inaction is itself an action, makes investigating the cost of delay an
important task. The following is a qualitative overview of the tradeoffs in delaying
investments in clean energy, a brief summary on problems of valuation, and a discussion
on disputes over the correct course of action.
Necessary Tradeoffs
Costs and Benefits over Time
While current energy efficiency initiatives, and some natural gas and renewable energy
initiatives, can provide no regrets strategies, they cannot tackle the immensity of climate
change on their own. Given that research and development is still needed to limit the
conflict between policy goals, any approach to address climate change, or lack thereof,
will face tradeoffs. In addition, because the costs of climate change are long-term, and
the need to provide energy security is a constant concern, tradeoffs between goals may
include a tension between satisfying today's wants with tomorrows. As researchers and
authors William D. Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer noted in their 2000 book on climate
change modeling:
... issues of greenhouse warming invokes the highest from of global citizenship -
where nations are being called upon to sacrifice hundreds of billions of dollars
of present consumption in an effort that will largely benefit people in other
countries, where the benefit will not come until well into the next century and
beyond, and where the threat is highly uncertain and based on modeling rather
than direct observation (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000, 4).
Without cost-effective alternatives to fossil fuels, the challenge of climate change comes
down to two options. One could shift to new technologies if and only when they meet the
same performance criteria and become cost-competitive with current applications, and
risk the consequence of continued emissions. Alternatively, one could motivate earlier
change to address climate change by internalizing the cost of carbon before the new and
old technologies converge, and bear the potential costs to economic growth and energy
security. The rate of technological development will determine if and when this tradeoff
would be made. As the EA notes:
The pace of technology development and deployment in these and other areas is
the key to making the global energy system more economically, socially and
environmentally sustainable in the long term. But consumers will have to be
willing to pay the fiull cost of energy - including environmental costs - bebre
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these technologies can become competitive. Governments must decide today to
accelerate this process (EA 2005d, 31).
Appropriate Timing of Action
Both the harms and benefits of delaying or taking action to address an environmental risk
are generally unknown. The assessment of future risks is limited given present
information. The disagreement over how to take action to address an environmental risk
essentially comes down to one over the decision to take precautionary action or wait for
proof before action (Kinzig et al 2003).
The degree of acceptability for measures to address climate change is strongly related to
their economic and security costs and the risk aversion of decision-makers. Some argue
that faced with uncertainties and long-term damages, society should take precautionary
action now. Others argue that as information is so limited, steps should be taken as they
become cost-competitive with traditional energy applications. In other words, finding
that climate change is real does not justify taking prompt action because the costs and
benefits of action are unclear.
Delaying action allows investors to gather more information and decrease uncertainties,
which in turn helps them make 'better' investment decisions. These advantages are
especially important for the energy industry which is capital intensive and whose capital
tends to be long-lived. Thus, by delaying, investors may decrease the possibility of
making a bad, irreversible investment. However, the choice to delay investments that
address an environment risk must be balanced by the irreversible harms of that
environment risk. Thus, one considers the irreversible and constraining expenditures of
an investment, versus the irreversible harm of an environmental risk that has not been
addressed (Dixit & Pindyck 2002).
The uncertainties associated with any adoption of a technology, such as the timing and
extent of diffusion and adoption, are compounded by uncertainties regarding the
effectiveness of a technology to address an environmental risk. Furthermore, should a
solution rely on the creation of a new technology, research and development (R&D)
uncertainties regarding the timing, and performance and cost improvements of an
innovation, contribute to the problem of appropriately addressing an environmental risk.
Valuation Difficulties
Willingness to Pay
Uncertainties make it difficult to value the cost and benefits of climate change mitigation
strategies because it is not always clear what they are. However, even if they were
known, quantifying them would still be difficult. Valuing the costs of damages from
climate change is imprecise because many of the items under threat have no market
value. They are not traded goods. In addition, many are public goods which are difficult
to value a market framework (CBO 2005). Furthermore, how does one go about
quantifying and agreeing on the cost of lost lives or species?
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Discounting
Even if one had precise numbers on the costs and benefits of action, valuation is still not
clear cut because of the necessary tradeoffs between now and the future. Conventional
economic analysis would discount the long-term benefits and costs, to account for the
opportunity cost of money. However, by discounting future values, the cost incurred now
to address climate change would be weighed more heavily than the benefits of mitigation
received later. The exact choice of a discount rate affects how significant this weighting
is.
Choosing a Discount Rate
As noted earlier in the discussion of investment risks, investors prefer projects with less
variability in return on investment due to risk aversion, so they often require a premium
before they are willing to accept projects with more uncertainty. As such, they tend to
adjust the discount rate for uncertainty, to increase rate of return. Because projects differ
in risk, it is reasonable for one entity to use several discount rates. Economists have
developed ways to determine an appropriate discount rate, such as the Weighted Average
Cost of Capital (WACC), or the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which accounts
for risk. 20 However, the theory is sometimes difficult to implement due to practical
impediments, such as difficulty in calculation, and 'non-rational' reasons such as risk
aversions (de Neufville 2003). Overall, despite an economically rational theory for
choosing a discount rater, individual risk perceptions can affect the choice. Also,
difficulties in calculation can provide the opportunity for debate on numbers.
Difficulty in Justifying Action
Regulatory Disputes
Theory
Many areas of policy rely on scientific facts to rationalize action. At times the science
goes undisputed, and controversy focuses on other considerations. However, in many
cases, opposition to the policy actions is made with claims that the science behind it is
contestable. In particular, a lack of scientific consensus or causal explanation especially
leaves science, and the policy that relies on it, vulnerable to challenge. In a 1987 article,
"Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science," Shiela Jasanoff, a Professor of
Science and T'echnology Studies at Harvard, considers the interaction of science and
policy (Jasanoff 1987). She presents the idea that science is 'deconstructed' and then
reconstructed' in the regulatory process. She also notes that the distinction between
science and policy is difficult to resolve not only because science is indeterminate, but
also because these delineations have political implications that make them politically
charged. Furthermore, the contest amongst actors to define who can influence the
20
0 The CAPM method of choosing discount rate adjusts the discount rate to incorporate risk. It does this by
distinguishing market risk from project risk. It observes that one can theoretically minimize individual
project risk by creating a diverse portfolio of projects that balance each other's individual risks out. It then
develops an index of undiversifiable market risk, called beta, against which one can measure the riskiness
of a project, and accordingly adjust discount rate. However, the method is not foolproof. Developing beta
can be tricky, and in practice, the choice of discount rate may still be affected by past experiences with
projects and comparable opportunities for investment. Furthermore, risk aversions differ among people (de
Neufville 2003).
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outcomes, takes place via boundary-defining language. Examples of these boundary
disputes are evident in dialogue.
According to Jasanoff, the rulemaking process takes an adversarial approach to
establishing claims, and in so doing exposes the uncertainty in and challenges the
authority of science. After 'deconstructing' knowledge, the regulator must then
'reconstruct' the knowledge to maintain her own authority and construct a plausible
rationale for action. In addition, Jasanoff asserts that this process of deconstruction and
reconstruction induces competition amongst policy-makers, scientists, and political
interest groups. The definition of an issue as a policy or a science issue affects who has
the authority to interpret the facts, and potentially affects the issues outcome. Either to
protect their authority or to influence the outcome, Jasanoff notes that actors use
boundary-defining language to distinguish science from policy, and ultimately further
their interests.
Health, environment, and safety regulation often becomes embroiled in debate over what
factors should be considered in decision-making, how credible the science used in
decision-making is, and who ultimately has control over deciding. Frequently
complicating the process is that experts can identify fundamental correlations but the
causation or extent of correlation is as yet indeterminate or not agreed upon by the
scientific community. Spurred by new identification of potential harms, policy-makers
often seek to take action. However, the basis of specific policy action is frequently left
contestable due to the limited understanding or pending scientific community's
consensus. As the former chairman of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee
(CASAC), Joe Mauderly, noted:
It is a rare circumstance where a scientist can look at the existing data at any
one time and prove beyond uncertainty that a specific level [of pollution] is the
right one to set [for the standard] (Breslin 2000, A176).
The focus case of this section is the contest over the credibility of climate change science.
It notes some recent disputes over climate change to highlight the difficulty of
rationalizing action when the science of causation and impact is still under development.
It then looks specifically at some of the policy options for taking action to note the effect
that uncertainties associated with climate change can have on policy-making.
Examples of Dispute and Indecision
For decades, politicians have debated the existence of climate change and the adequacy
of science to confirm it. A recent example in the U.S. demonstrates the contest between
politicians and scientists that can emerge in the face of scientific uncertainty. Another
example involving national scientific academies illustrates the fine line between objective
scientific input and political action, and the discontent that may ensue should
policymakers perceive that the line has been crossed.
Congressman Joe Barton from Texas has been chairman of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce since 2004. In June of 2005, he sent five letters to the National
Science Foundation, the IPCC, and Dr. Michael Mann, Dr. Malcolm K. Hughes, and
Raymond S. Bradley, requesting information regarding global warming studies. The
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letter to Dr. Mann, for example, offered eighteen days to provide a large quantity of
information including: a full list of his studies, financial support by study and source, data
sources and analysis methods, and defense of criticisms of his work. While a
congressional request to scientists for clarification on issues is not uncommon, many saw
Barton's actions as aggressive, and an attempt to discredit scientific research. A letter in
response to Barton's request, from the American Association for the Advancement of
Science illustrates such concerns:
Your letters, however, in their request for highly detailed information regarding
not only the scientists' recent studies but also their life's work, give the
impression of a search for some basis on which to discredit these particular
scientists and findings, rather than a search for understanding. With all respect,
we question whether this approach is goodfor the processes by which scientific
findings on topics relevant to public policy are generated and used.
- AAAS, June 13th 2005.21
While Congressman Barton cited that the political implications of the scientific studies
justified their questioning, Barton's critics worried about keeping scientific review in the
scientific community. The AAAS letter continued:
While we fiXlly understand that the policy-making functions of the Congress
require integrating the best available understanding of relevant science with
other considerations, we think it would be unfortunate if Congress tried to
become a participant in the scientific peer-review process itself.
- AAAS, June 13th 2005.
Thus, apart from the wording or manner of investigation, the dispute was also territorial,
concerning who had the right to contest indeterminate science that has a significant affect
on policymaking.
A slight controversy over a joint statement on climate change made by national science
academies highlights the difference in approaches that countries are taking on climate
change, but also illustrates the fine line between objective scientific input and making
political statements. On June 7t h , 2005, shortly before world leaders were to meet at
Gleneagles for the annual G8 Summit in July, eleven heads of national science academies
around the world urged international leaders to take action on climate change, and noted
22
six action items.22 In their words: "The scientific understanding of climate change is now
sufficiently clear to justify nations taking prompt action." While the timing and
specificity of the statement may have implied political advocacy to some, a dispute
between two administrators who signed the agreement illustrates just how fine the line
boundary science and politics is. Lord May of the Royal Society in the United Kingdom
issued a controversial press release the day the joint statement was issued. In it, he said:
The current US policy on climate change is misguided. The Bush administration
has consistently refused to accept the advice of the US National Academy of
Sciences (NAS). ... President Bush has an opportunity at Gleneagles to signal
21IAvailable online at: http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2005/0714etter.pdf.
Also, a full copy of a letter sent from Chairman Barton to Dr. Mann, and the letter from the AAAS to
Chairman Barton is available in Appendix III.
22 Please see Appendix IV for the full statement.
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that his administration will no longer ignore the scientific evidence and act to cut
emissions" - Lord May, June 7 h 2005.23
A day after, the head of the National Academy of Sciences in the U.S., Dr. Bruce Alberts,
wrote to Lord May to express chagrin at Lord May's statement. He also accused him of
misinterpreting the work for the US NAS and stated, "You have in fact vitiated much of
the careful effort that went into preparing the actual G8 statement" (Dr. Alberts, June 8 th
242005). 24 In addition, US members of Congress became involved in the dispute when
Senator Larry Craig of Idaho wrote to Dr. Alberts expressing concern over the
statement. 2 5
Several elements of Jasanoff's thesis ring true in the case of climate change. While the
above examples are not an exhaustive study of the climate change issue, they do provide
some evidence that stakeholders of the rulemaking process have engaged in boundary
disputes that centered on the issue of science's credibility. The political implications of
scientific results make credibility a contentious issue. As Jasanoff notes, the distinction
between science and policy is difficult to resolve because the science is indeterminate,
but also because these delineations have political implications that make them politically
charged. Dispute over who has the authority to clarify and interpret uncertainty
exemplifies the problem of justifying policy action when the science is indeterminate. It
also highlights the potential for ensuing regulatory uncertainty.
Uncertainty and Indecision about Policy Mechanisms
Even given agreement on the credibility of science behind climate change studies, the
appropriate policy response, including if one is even needed, is still contestable. The
timing, stringency, and appropriate mechanisms are the focus of much debate. The
following highlights the potential problem of regulatory uncertainty given that agreement
over the appropriate mitigation policies is still lacking.
Policymakers around the globe have derived several options to mitigate GHG emissions.
Some of them have already been implemented. However, policy mechanisms continue to
develop. Policymakers and analysts debate the best approach to mitigate GHG
emissions, in part because of differences in valuation and risk aversion. However,
uncertainty about the costs and benefits per GHG reduction make crafting the optimal
policy even more trying as it exacerbates differences in opinion about what is the optimal
approach. Some of the most commonly debated policies include economic incentive
policies such as price-based and quantity-based mechanisms. Uncertainty plays in.
A price-based mechanism for reducing GHG emissions is a GHG emissions tax. By
placing a tax on GHG emissions, the policy increases the cost of using carbon-intensive
23 Available online at http:Hcraig.senate.aov/royalsocietyO6O7O5.pdf
24 Available online at http://craig.senate.gov/roalsociety60705.pdf
24Available online at http://craig.senate.gzov/nas060805.pdf
25 Note: Senator Larry Craig wrote: "Indeed, it appears to me that the Joint Statement is being hijacked by
the Royal Society for reasons that have nothing to do with the advancement of scientific understanding of
this most complex and controversial subject. I would appreciate a clarification of the meaning of the Joint
Science Academies Statement. I am also interested in the origins of this Statement and am very curious
about the timing of the release of this Statement" (Senator Craig, June 8 th 2005). Available online at
http://craig.senate.pgov/larrycraig060805.pdf
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energy sources and encourages mitigation. Taxation of upstream sources (input fuels)
would make the policy relatively easy to implement and quite comprehensive. Because
regulated entities would take mitigation measures below or equal to the cost of the tax
level, the upper limit of mitigation costs is apparent. The amount of emissions that would
be reduced from the policy, however, is uncertain.
An alternative to a price-based mechanism is a quantity-based mechanism such as a cap-
and-trade system. Such a system caps overall emissions and allocates or auctions
allowances, the ight to emit, to regulated entities. The total of allowances equals the
cap. This mechanism assures a set level of emissions reductions, and permits mitigation
to be done cost-effectively as regulated entities can trade allowances as needed.
However, the overall cost of mitigation is uncertain. Also, administrative and
enforcement difficulties could limit the program to a smaller and more manageable
number of entities.
Both mechanisms have advantages and drawbacks, and equity issues are a concern for
each. Furthermore, setting the stringency for either mitigation policy is difficult given
the uncertainties. Ideally, one would want to set the marginal cost of abatement to the
marginal benefit, and both are unknown. However, the presence of uncertainties also
leads to disagreement in determining the appropriate policy mechanism, regardless of
stringency. If the benefits were the only unknown, either policy would be suitable.
Stringency would be the only issue as both would 'miss their mark' by the same amount.
However, because costs are also unknown, a policy tradeoff arises: is society more
concerned about uncertainty in the cost of mitigation or more about uncertainty in the
amount of reduction? A US Congressional Budge Office (CBO) report on the matter
asserts that analysts prefer price-based mechanisms in this scenario because one has a
better chance of minimizing the cost of choosing the wrong stringency. However, they
also note that if nonlinear effects exist, such as a threshold above which abrupt climate
change occurs, quantity-based mechanisms may be more preferable. 26
Overall, uncertainty in the particulars of climate change makes it difficult to justify
action. Even if corporations and the policymakers agreed to take precautionary action,
however, the mechanism by which to do that is still unclear.
Examples of Divergent Strategies
Policymakers
While there are many similarities in strategic approaches addressing climate change, such
as increased energy efficiency and renewable energy use, many regions' initiatives vary.
The difference in programs highlights the tension between policy goals, and the tradeoffs
that must be made in the face of lack of technological solutions. For example, though the
United Kingdom is accountable for less than 2% of global emissions (UK 2004), it has
set stringent emissions reduction target levels and is one of the leading countries in
Europe to take action. Also, a 2004 review of by the Climate Change Secretariat notes
that Europe has tended to use financial measures to incorporate the cost of carbon and
incentivize innovation (Climate Change Secretariat 2004). The United States, on the
2'6 For more specifics on the debate, please see (CBO 2005).
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other hand has relied on a voluntary approach that focuses on technological innovation.
A 2005 White House fact sheet on climate change notes the Administration's preference
for waiting for technological solutions:
Like us, developing countries are unlikely to join in approaches that foreclose
their own economic growth and development." ... "The President promotes
technological innovation to achieve the combined goals of addressing climate
change, reducing harmful air pollution and improving energy security
(White House 2005).
In addition, support for policy actions can vary, even amongst the same category of
decision-makers. A comparison of two statements made by the Senate, one passed in
1997 and the other passed in 2005, reveals such a situation. In July of 1997, circa
international talks about the Kyoto Protocol, the US Senate passed a resolution that
expressed their disfavor of mandatory GHG emissions limits (U.S. Congress 1997).27
However, as a component of an energy bill passed by the Senate in 2005, the Senate
expressed their support for mandatory steps to mitigate climate change (U.S. Congress
2005).28
Industry
Companies have also taken a variety of approaches for dealing with climate change,
different in terms of both timing and stringency. A 2002 study of multinational oil
companies' response to climate change provides insight. Please see Table 3 for a
summary of findings on climate position. Authors Kolk and Levy note that the
divergence in action may in part to be due to different valuations of tradeoffs and varying
risk aversions among the institutions in the countries in which they operate.
Markets are embedded in social and political structures, so their rationality is
contingent upon these broaderframes of references. Managers attempt to make
rational calculations on cost and benefits of various strategies, but these
calculations are premised upon assumptions and forecasts that are themselves
shaped by interactions with competitors, governments, the media, and other
institutions (Levy & Kolk 2002, 297).
27 Note: "The United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other
agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of
1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or thereafter, which would: (A)
mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I
Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country
Parties within the same compliance period, or (B) would result in serious harm to the
economy of the United States..."
28 Note: "It is the sense of the Senate that Congress should enact a comprehensive and effective
national program of mandatory, market-based limits and incentives on emissions of greenhouse
gases that slow, stop, and reverse the growth of such emissions at a rate and in a manner that--
(1) will not significantly harm the United States economy; and
(2) will encourage comparable action by other nations that are major trading
partners and key contributors to global emissions."
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Corporate actions are also related to other business decisions such as organizational
structure and market position, highlighting the interaction that climate change strategy
can have with other corporate goals. 9 A 2001 study by the same authors noted for
example: "Exxon's tradition, structure and strategy-making process seems to have made
it more prone to insular thinking than a decentralized company such as Shell" (Levy &
Kolk 2001, 506).
A separate analysis of strategic planning in major oil companies notes the challenges that
the industry face today. Author Robert M. Grant observes the difficulty of developing
strategy when prediction provides limited accuracy. He also describes their attempts to
reconcile difficulties. He writes:
The challenge of making strategy when the future is unknowable encouraged
reconsideration of both the processes of strategy formulation and the nature of
organizational strategy (Grant 2003, 493).
His study also reveals the limited use of new strategy tools and concepts, and questions
the effectiveness of recent adaptations.
Decentralization and informality of strategic planning processes permitted
access to a broader range of expertise, but there was limited use of new tools and
concepts of strategic analysis and little evidence that the systems of strategic
planning were conducive to strategic innovation (Grant 2003, 515).
Overall, the variation of corporate strategies and evidence of limited innovation in the
area of strategic analysis, exemplifies the difficulty of developing ways to address
climate change. Uncertainties about the development, benefits and costs of options to
cope with climate change make valuation of strategies difficult. Other issues such as
organizational structure and regulatory uncertainty affect the development and
implementation of climate change strategies.
29 For more detail on these other aspects, see (Levy and Kolk 2001).
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Table 3. Summary of Major Oil Companies' Responses to Climate Change
Topic BP ExxonMobil Shell Texaco
Climate science Precautionary Science too Precautionary "Need to move
principle uncertain for action principle beyond science"
View on Kyoto Broadly supportive Opposed Broadly supportive Supports mandatory
Protocol controls, but not
Kyoto specifically
Global Climate Left in 1996 Stayed until end of Left in April 1998 Left in February
Coalition individual 2000
membership memberships in
2000
'Pro-active' Pew Center, EPA California Fuel Cell Pew Center, California Fuel Cell
partnerships Climate Wise Partnership (since California Fuel Partnership,
Program, California early 2001)2 Cell Partnership, WBSCD
Fuel Cell WBCSD,
Partnership, trading International
system with EDF, Emissions Trading
EPA voluntary Association
GHG reporting,
WBCSD,
International
Emissions Trading
Association
Trading and Started Internal Began reporting Internal
monitoring of measurement and measurement of CO2 emissions and measurement of
GHGs internal trading in emission data global warming emission data
1997; appointed potential over 1998
external accountants in externally
in 6/1999 to verify verified HSE
internal system. report. Launched
internal trading in
1/2000. 
Quantitative GHG NA Target set 10/1998 NA
targets to reduce GHG
more than 10% by
2002.6
Main investments Owns Solarex, NA Solar factories in Invested $67.3 m.
in renewables world's largest PV Germany, Japan, for 20% interest in
producer. Invested and Netherlands. ECD (advanced
$100 m. in 5/2000 in Announced batteries, fuel cells
online green retail renewables and solar
electricity company. investments of technology). 9
~~~~~~7 ~$500 m. in next 5
years in 10/1997.8
Solar joint venture
with Siemens and
EON since 2001.
Main fuel-cell Partnership with Exxon-GM and Daimler and Texaco Energy
activities Ford in 2000 Toyota in 2000 Ballard since 1998 Systems in 1999
Source: Levy and Kolk 2002, 287.
Notes: 1) According to the authors, where no sources are given, data are derived from company interviews
and the official website. For details on other sources, please see original document.
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2) While noting the divergent approaches to climate change, the authors also note that the global nature of
the problem and the market in which the companies operate, along with more scientific information, means
that companies' approaches are converging. The above chart does not note changes since 2002.
The Limitations of Prediction
Energy forecasts have gone amiss for as long as they have been made, regardless of the
expertise used to develop one. Figure 8 highlights some notable misses in forecasting
energy consumption. Other forecasts of the future of nuclear and solar power, and the
exhaustion of energy resources, have gone awry regardless of predictor's credentials.30
Figure 8. US Primary Energy Consumption Forecasts
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The task of prediction is an inherently troubled one. Increasing the reality of a model, for
example, produces its own problems. As Vaclav Smil, a researcher at the University of
Manitoba noted in paper about the troublesome issues he had with forecasts:
'0 See Vaclav Smil 2000 for more detail on examples.
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Greater complexity that was required to make the forecasts more realistic also
necessitated the introduction of longer chains of concatenated assumptions-and
this necessity was defeating the very quest for greater realism (Smil, 2, 2000).
Several other challenges to modeling make accurate forecasting difficult. Professor John
Sterman, Director of Massachusetts Institute of Technology's System Dynamics Group,
notes other modeling issues. For example, delays in data reporting and calculation lessen
one's ability to respond to current changes and trends. To address this issue, one may
consider shortening the delays. However, this often compromises the reliability of the
data.
In addition, discerning temporal fluctuations from trends in the data can be a difficult
task. Increasing the time horizon of analysis may help elucidate noise from trend.
Nevertheless, it reduces the ability of stakeholders to respond promptly to changes in the
system. In general, Sterman notes, it often takes time to recognize and accept a trend as
genuine, as well as generate and implement the appropriate steps to react to once it is
acknowledged.
Because it is difficult to discern noise from fact, and as forecasts often rely on knowledge
of the past to speculate the future, forecasts tend to be most precise when the behavior of
system drivers is steady. Changes in drivers may have an unexpected impact on the
system and thus the item one is forecasting. Technological breakthrough, for example, is
a difficult event to predict, which may have a significant effect on the system. Sterman
notes:
...forecasting methods are particularly poor when there are changes in trends,
noise, and other sources of turbulence. These are precisely the times when
people are most interested in forecasts" (Sterman 2000, 655).
Overall, there are multiple factors that affect the system one is forecasting from, and even
if many are well understood, their interaction may not be. Even when systems are
believed to be well understood, unforeseen events can dramatically change ones results.
Forecasts, which are often used to make decisions to adjust to or affect the future, are
thus often wrong just when you need them most. While forecasts can give a good sense
trends that may continue to the future, their predications may well be erroneous. The
future is not guaranteed, and as seductive as forecasts may be to help guide policy, it is
not necessarily wise to build to their prediction.
Conclusion
How, if, and when energy systems are going to evolve to provide a cleaner, more secure
energy future is unclear. It depends on the choices that consumers, government, and
industry make. Expected trends include increasing regulation of carbon, increased
regulation and incentive for energy efficiency, and a diverse energy portfolio including
more clean energy technologies. Markets can change quickly and are unpredictable, due
to policy changes, variance in consumer preference and technological breakthroughs.
Furthermore, payoffs that would ordinarily justify investments can be unclear.
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Unfortunately, forecasting provides limited help. To minimize the disruption and costs
that impending changes may induce, or to even operate successfully in a climate of
change, industry and government will need a deeper understanding of and better
management tools for multiple uncertainties.
Also, given the multiple goals and constraints the energy system is faced with how
should one take action to maximize future gains while maximizing current gains? Actors
need to be able to judge what an appropriate cost of an action is even if they do not know
exactly what the payoff is. They need to know what to look for, be able to gauge some of
the uncertainties discussed above, and develop criteria to determine when and how to
take action.
Understanding climate change is difficult because of all of the uncertainties of its impacts
and causation. Coping with it is even more problematic because of the interaction it has
with other goals of energy security and poverty reduction. To promote a cleaner,
sustainable future, actors need to understand the costs and benefits of investments, and
develop a way to examine and determine the appropriate time and extent to invest.
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Chapter 4: Approaches to Looking at the Cost of
Delaying Investments
Research Question- Two Interpretations
The motivating question for this research is what is the cost of delaying investments in
clean energy? One could approach this question with two consequences in mind - the
impacts on the environment or those on businesses. The two overlap, but can lead down
different research paths. For example, one could focus on the environmental impacts and
attempt to fiscally quantify the environmental cost of what is irreversible, quantify the
economic cost of clean-up for what is reversible, and quantify the indirect public health
costs from both types of damage. This effort focuses on assessing the impact of an
environmental harm, and is somewhat similar to the current efforts of localities to
quantify their risk from climate change.
Alternatively, one could frame the question in terms of a business, and consider the
business impacts of changes in environmental policy. This analysis would look at the
usual risks of investment and design for engineering projects, but in an environmental
context. A modern trend of addressing environmental harms by internalizing the cost of
externalities or setting standards is changing the setting in which businesses operate. For
example, environmental standards may confer advantages to businesses able to respond
more quickly. Alternatively, regulation may spur markets for new products. Under a
market approach to dealing with environmental harms, investors may face several new
uncertainties with a shift in environmental policy. Multiple technology choices exist, and
uncertainties about their adoption and ability to effectively address an environmental
harm (while being cost effective) make evaluating the choices difficult. In addition,
uncertainties about the timing of implementation and adoption make timing an
investment tricky. Businesses' response to emerging or impending standards and new
energy pricing will likely affect their success in the short- and long-run.
Analysis of both of the above contexts is a difficult task given the large uncertainties
associated with the causation and impact of some environmental harms and the intricacy
that unpredictable human response contributes to the calculation. Both also require
interdisciplinary knowledge in economics, engineering, or science and how to cope with
uncertainty. However, while both areas are fertile grounds for research, understanding
about the latter seems slower to emerge. This research focuses on the business impacts of
environmental policy changes and the ways in which decision-makers can cope with
uncertainties brought about by those changes. The following note proposed ways to
address the question of what is the cost of delaying investments in clean energy, from a
private investment perspective. The subsequent chapter looks more closely at the tools of
system dynamics and real options as feasible ways to carry out the first method.
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Method - Two Approaches
To focus on the business aspects of the original research question-what are the costs of
delaying investments in clean energy?-one might consider the current tools for
investment decision-making or look to historical data for insight. The following
describes the two research paths and elucidates my preference for analyzing and
developing decision-making tools.
Scenario Analysis to Develop Uncertainty Distributions
Proposed Method: Develop a dynamic model of the endogenous supply and demand
factors in a market for a clean energy technology. Conduct a sensitivity analysis to
understand the potential pathways for market development under varying values of
exogenous factors. This may be accomplished by generating scenarios based on expert
judgment or by simulating random values for the exogenous factors. This step helps to
understand the sensitivity of the market to various inputs and inform decision-makers
what factors to monitor for potential changes in the market. Next, generate an
uncertainty distribution for demand growth given simulated scenarios and determine an
expected return using a set decision rule for investment.31 Then, alter the decision rule
for investment and compare how changes in the timing and extent of investment affects
expected returns (over a range of demand scenarios).
A model of the endogenous factors of supply and demand, along with scenario analysis
of the exogenous factors, could provide a useful tool for understanding the characteristics
of uncertainties associated with clean energy investments and resulting market growth.
In addition, it could help understand the advantages or disadvantages of investment
strategies.
EXAMPLE DATA NEEDS
Supply
* Costs
Learning curves for construction and operation
Base costs for natural gas reserves, production costs, transportation of product
* GTL production facility characteristics
Demand
* Costs
Refinery processing costs to meet fuel standards
Costs for facility upgrades
* Refinery facility characteristics
* Average oil reserve quality
* Sulfur emissions produced per combustion of a certain standard fuel
31 Decision rules may include a traditional method of forecasted demand based on forecasting, and a
positive NPV calculation. More on the NPV calculation follows in Chapter 5.
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ADVANTAGES
* This approach will develop a tool that is useful for making decisions under uncertainty
in multiple situations, rather than just cases where a market for a pollutant has already
developed (see discussion below).
* This approach does not rely on historical data. This is important as the future may not
be like the past. In addition, carbon emission markets, a potential source of data on
climate change, are still settling.
POTENTIAL ISSUES
* 'Accuracy' of scenarios and probability assignments
* Model accuracy (simplifications, unforeseen contributors to potential market
development)
OTHER COMMENTS
* Even if the model does not accurately 'predict', one would expect to still gain insights
from the process of modeling (e.g. sensitive factors for market growth).
* Further issues to consider:
-Is this an appropriate use of system dynamics and what are the pitfalls?
-How to accurately create a probability distribution from an analysis of the model?
Please see Chapter 5 for more discussion on system dynamics.
Analyze Historical Data
Method: Mine historical data on emissions markets and mitigation costs to see if there
were any gains or losses from delaying investments to meet a standard. A comparison of
businesses' investment decisions, and their cost of compliance with credit purchases
versus technology investments, may provide insight.
Alternatively, one could consider historical data to forecast future market volatility and
conduct a real options analysis of potential clean energy investments for the future. The
price of emissions would be the underlying asset, and the price volatility could be
extracted from data to estimate uncertainty. The investment in an emissions mitigation
technology would be an option. The option expiration time would be linked to the timing
of compliance assessments.
EXAMPLE DATA NEEDS & SOURCES
* Price of emissions over time (e.g. carbon or sulfur)
* Investment timing, costs, and effects
* European Climate Exchange
* Chicago Climate Exchange
ADVANTAGES
* Data is concrete, and little guesswork about uncertainty profiles is needed.
POTENTIAL ISSUES
* It may be difficult to access data on investment costs.
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* The markets are still stabilizing for carbon emissions trading, and the scope of this
study is somewhat limited to clean energy investments where markets exist.
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Chapter 5: Real Options and System Dynamics
Uncertain timing, causation, and impact of environmental risks encourage deferral of
investment. But the opportunity cost of investment, lag to develop options, and delay
between action and effect limit the ability to defer action without consequence. Options
cultivate the flexibility to respond to environmental risks whose magnitudes are currently
uncertain. However, strategic investments are necessary because options come at a cost,
and path dependencies may link past investments to future opportunities. Theoretically,
system dynamics and real options could help to understand pathway limitations, address
uncertainty, and allow action while avoiding building to a prediction.
The following reviews the theory of real options by highlighting its advantages over
traditional practices, as well as some of its limitations. The next section discusses system
dynamics, and again addresses its potential advantages as well as limitations.
Real Options
Introduction
The phrase 'real options' was first coined by Stewart Myers in 1977. An extension of
financial option theory, real options theory considers physical projects rather than
financial assets.3 2 By using analysis methods borrowed from financial options theory,
real options analysis is able to quantify the value of increased flexibility in a project,
which allows managers to respond better to an uncertain future. Such options include
flexibility in investment timing or even in the physical design of an engineered project.
Though still a relatively new field, researchers have explored real options theory for an
array of subjects, spanning from oil field investments to biotechnology research and
development, to flexible design in architectural spaces.
The following section reviews real options theory to note its potential benefits and
limitations with regard to the problem of clean energy investments. Without going into
mathematical detail, it considers the evolution of the theory's application from 1994 to
2005. It then specifies how the theory, in its many forms, can help address some of the
issues of clean energy investment, noted in Chapter 3. It also notes the potential
limitations of real option theory. Finally, it discusses some examples of real options
theory in practice to examine how it has so far been applied to problems of energy, the
environment, or both. Thus, while this chapter does not review financial option theory or
discuss real options calculations in detail, it does provide a brief overview to demonstrate
how the theory fits in with the issues of clean energy investment.33
32 Financial assets such as: property or commodities, rather than stock, currency, and debt.
33 More detail can be found in the references of this chapter. For examples, Wang 2005 provides a quick
and basic introduction to financial options and real options theory. More detail on analytical application of
real options theory can be found in Wang 2005, Dixit & Pindyck 1994 and Smit & Tirgeorgis 2004.
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The Theoretical Contribution of Real Options
The underlying concepts of real options theory provide a unique view of investment and
design, and offer the possibility of valuing flexibility. Researchers over the years have
presented various approaches to and uses of real options analysis. The approaches
overlap to some extent, but also vary in their perspective. Overall, they are a good source
for potential innovation in strategic decision-making, design, and analysis. The following
considers three developments relevant to clean energy investment decision-making and
the question of what is the cost or advantage of delaying investments. Despite the care of
authors mentioned here, a word of caution from Adam Borison, a management and
decision analysis expert, is worth noting for users. He warns against the inappropriate
application of real options analysis. He observes that to use real options theory, and the
financial analysis tools it borrows from, one must abide by specific assumptions.
Veering from these assumptions can make application of theory easier and available for
more issues, but also may skew or invalidate its results (Borison 2003).34
Real Options and Investment
In their 1994 book, Investment Under Uncertainty, Avinash Dixit and Robert Pindyck
discuss the use of real options theory to derive rules for optimal investment decision-
making. They focus on partially or completely irreversible investments where there is
uncertainty about the future rewards of the investment and where it is possible to defer
investments. The crux of their argument questions the traditional net present value
(NPV) investment rule,3 5 including its assumption that investments are inflexible and are
now or never. Dixit and Pindyck posit that should one have the ability to defer an
investment, one may gain more information in the time of delay before making the
investment. In the midst of uncertainty, this could improve the design of and resulting
rewards from the investment. In contrast to the traditional NPV approach, a real options
view of investment values the option of waiting for new information by acknowledging
the opportunity cost of making an investment immediately.
Real options theory derives this result by drawing an analogy between an investment
opportunity and a call option. As such, an investment opportunity may be seen as the
right, but not the obligation, to buy an asset at some future time. Thus, when one makes
an investment expenditure, he or she exercises the option to invest, and gives up the
possibility to wait for new information. In terminating their opportunity to wait by
investing immediately, the investor looses the option value of their investment. The
opportunity cost of investing now, is thus the lost option value.
34 Financial options theory is able to quantify the value of an option by comparing it to a group of assets
whose value correlates with the option as the market changes over time. This group of assets is otherwise
known as a replicating portfolio. The existence of a replicating portfolio and the idea that the market are
free of arbitrage, are two critical assumptions for valuation. These assumptions may be quite difficult to
abide by for physical assets that are not traded on the market. To work within these criteria, analysts often
make assumptions about the projects and the assets they are correlated to. Some of these assumptions are
non-controversial while others are.
For an outline of real options analysis approaches, see Borison 2003.
35 At its most basic, this rule is to invest (or abandon investment) when NPV > 0.
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A real options view of investment thus modifies the NPV rule to incorporate the
opportunity cost of investment. It becomes: invest if the Value of Investment > Cost +
Value of Option to defer. Along with deriving this formula, Dixit and Pindyck provide
examples of how real options analysis can result in new critical values for investment.
To do so, they make use of dynamic programming and contingent claims analysis.
Similar to financial option analysis, the option cost and value of investment are sensitive
to the uncertainty of future values of the project. The option value increases with an
increase in uncertainty. Another similarity to financial options analysis is the ability to
limit the downside of an investment. If the rewards of an investment increase in value,
then the payoff from investment increases. However, should the asset decrease in value,
investors may choose not to invest and they would lose only the cost of creating the
option to postpone the decision.
Dixit and Pindyck's important modification to the traditional NPV rule applies only
under the conditions of irreversibility and uncertainty mentioned above. Without an
amount of irreversibility or an ability to make the same investment in the future, the
opportunity cost of investing today would be irrelevant. Also, value from the option to
defer comes from the fact that the future value of the asset obtained by investing is
uncertain and payoffs might not be as expected. If they were known, deferral would add
no value. Furthermore, the influence of irreversibility on an investment decision
decreases as the time to delay decrease, or the larger the cost of delaying. Overall,
however, Dixit and Pindyck note that given the availability, deferring an investment to
tomorrow should be a choice one should consider today, because it can add value to a
project.
Limitations
Despite the value of the framework Dixit and Pindyck present, difficulties in application
of the theory remain. First, the option to defer is not always clear cut: the same exact
investment opportunity might not be available in the future. For example, it may not still
be available or if there may be irreversible costs to delaying. Such costs could range
from foregone cash flows, to loss of strategic position, or irreversible environmental
consequences, depending on the situation one is considering. Dixit and Pindyck indeed
note that while the benefits of waiting for new information could be large, one should
weight the cost to delay against its benefits. Pindyck gives the issue of irreversible
environmental costs more attention in a 2002 paper of his, discussed more below. In
addition, the option analysis framework does not discuss or resolve potential issues of
timing lags and path dependencies in investment projects, which may affect the
attractiveness of options. With regard to valuation, real options theory is able to
incorporate a risk-neutral discount rate. However, Dixit and Pindyck posit that the
correct discount rate need not be constant over time and not equal to the weighted
average cost of capital. Rather, they say that options analysis yields the appropriate
discount rate. Nevertheless issues of valuation due to the choice of discount rate could
still persist as many view economic valuation with skepticism. Finally, as Dixit and
Pindyck note in the book's conclusion, methods used to calculate option values, can get
very complicated very fast. In order to use the financial tools of financial options theory,
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real options must abide by the same rules. Doing so is difficult when underlying assets
being analyzed are not traded on the market.3 6 Furthermore, many of the calculations
involve non-linear equations.
Real Options and Strategic Theory
Han Smit and Lenos Trigeorgis discuss the combination of game theory and real options
theory in their 2004 book, Strategic Investment. By combining the two theories, they are
able to value and quantify flexibility in decision-making while acknowledging the
strategic value of limiting flexibility for reasons of competition. Commitment to a plan
of action, for example, can influence how competing firms choose to invest.
By resolving the potential conflicts between the theories, they devise a framework to help
managers develop and quantitatively assess strategic moves in the face of uncertainty.
While real options theory encourages investors to create options that give them the
flexibility to respond to situations as they unfold, competitive strategy encourages
investors to limit their flexibility in order to send a credible signal of commitment to
rivals. In order to acknowledge this potential tradeoff, and do a complete analysis of
strategic factors, Smit and Trigeorgis present a new investment criterion. The revised
NPV criterion becomes: Expanded (strategic) NPV = (passive) NPV + flexibility
(option) value + strategic (game-theoretic) value (Smit & Trigeorgis 2004, 13).
Smit and Trigeorgis find unity in the seemingly conflicting theories in that both
contribute to overall strategy formulation. In the words of the authors:
The combinedframework provides a dynamic view of business strategy to assist
practitioners in the building of long-run competitive advantages and strategic
adaptability (Smit & Trigeorgis 2004, 439).
Rather than simply promoting or discouraging flexibility, as the theories may imply
individually, together they acknowledge the potential value of switching strategic paths
over time, and recognize that strategy is often formed in the midst of a competitive
environment. The concept of real options is thus valuable beyond individual project
considerations, to strategic market considerations. Real options theory is useful for
strategic considerations, according to the authors, because it recognizes that investments
are made sequentially over time.
In using real options theory to consider strategic investment, Smit and Trigeorgis view
firms' growth potential as, "a package of corporate real options that is actively managed
by the firm and that my influence and be affected by competitive action" (Smit and
Trigeorgis, xxv). During the discussion of growth potential, Smit and Trigeorgis note the
path dependency of firms' investment possibilities. They refer to Dynamic Capabilities
theory that views competence as a factor of growth potential, and note that competence-
building strategies are path-dependent.
By expanding real options theory beyond project evaluation to strategy adaptation, Smit
and Trigeorgis help create a quantitative framework for evaluating strategy in a dynamic,
36 Please see Borison 2003 for more detail.
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uncertain environment. This framework balances the tradeoffs of investing right away
versus deferring. As game theory reveals, it is not always valuable to keep options open.
Real options theory, in turn, can be used to help managers capitalize on the unforeseen
opportunities and avoid downside losses. As noted before, real options theory reveals the
fact that increased uncertainty can actually increase the value of options, which
asymmetrically positions a project to avoid the downside while taking advantage of the
upside.
Limitations
Smit and Trigeorgis directly address analyzing the potential cost of delay by
incorporating game theory with real options. They do, however, restrict their analysis to
corporate competitive strategy. The authors also briefly discuss the potential path
dependency among strategic options for a company. While they highlight the issue and
bring attention to the dynamic dimension of strategy, however, they do not present detail
on how to consider path dependencies and incorporate analysis within the real options
framework. Discussion regarding the existence of time lags to develop and receive
returns on options is also not notable. On a separate note, while the use of decision trees
and computer programming can help keep analyses manageable, the potential for
calculations to become complicated is quite high, and care is needed. Furthermore, while
combining real options and game theory analysis provides a valuable approach, it
requires broader knowledge. This could pose a problem for the adoption of such
methods. Throughout, however, the authors do pay attention to the need for simple
methods to calculate option values. Overall, the authors present an impressive
framework for evaluating strategy, which combines qualitative and quantitative theories.
The above discussion of limitations is not meant to criticize their work. Rather, it is a
notice of areas where further work in the field could help address issue of clean energy
investment decision-making.
Real Options "In" Versus "On" Projects
Professor Richard de Neufville and Tao Wang, among others, expand real options theory
beyond the traditional focus of investment to that of design. Apart from flexibility of an
investment, one may be able to embed flexibility in the function of a project. De
Neufville notes the distinction between flexibility on an investment and that related to its
design. He and Wang term the two option types as 'on' versus 'in', respectively. 'On'
options are concerned with project while 'in' options are concerned with design (Wang
2005).
Developing 'in' options is another way to adopt the benefits of real options theory. It
allows one to adjust operations as conditions change over time. In the face of
uncertainty, such flexibility can increase the value of a project by limiting its liability or
increasing its rewards. By allowing managers to deal with uncertainty proactively, 'in'
options take advantage of uncertainty when possible and adapts to situations as they
unfold. Timing flexibility is thus not the only way to incorporate flexibility into an
investment
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However, the creation and use of 'in' options is slightly different than traditional
applications of real options theory. To develop 'in' options for a project, one must have
sophisticated and technical understanding of it. According to Wang, even identifying 'in'
options can be a difficult task because of the slue of design variables and parameters.
Like strategic 'on' options, 'in' options can be path-dependent. Wang notes, however,
that interdependence is likely a larger issue of 'in' options. Wang provides a general
comparison of the differences between 'in' and 'on' options in his 2005 PhD dissertation
(please see Table 4).
Table 4. Comparison of 'in' and 'on' Real Options
Real Options 'on' Projects Real Options 'in' Projects
Value opportunities Design flexibility
Valuation important Decision important (go or not go)
Relatively easy to define Difficult to define
Interdependency / Path-dependency less of an Interdependency / Path-dependency an
issue important issue
Source: Wang 2005, 294.
Limitations
The concept of 'in' options is a unique and valuable way to make use of flexibility to
increase the value of projects. The novelty of designing flexibility in engineered projects,
while exciting, may present additional challenges through. For example, current real
options analysis requires assumptions that may stray far from the reality of 'in' projects.
As Wang notes, "real options 'in' projects are different and need an appropriate analysis
framework - existing options analysis has to adapt to the special features of real options
'in' projects" (Wang 2005, 295). In response to this problem, Wang develops and tests a
framework for 'in' options. It involves two phases: options identification using an
optimization model, and then an option value analysis phase using stochastic mixed-
integer programming with real options constraints. Wang also notes the general
difficulties in using a real options methodology, including access to historical data and
teaching others to understand and have confidence in the method. Historical data about
financial markets is necessary for an objective analysis. Though simulations are feasible,
they can inject assumptions into the model. Overall, similar if not more difficulties arise
with the use of 'in' options. However, its concept is exciting and applications have so far
shown its value.
Real Options and Energy and the Environment
Analysts have used real options theory to evaluate investments in energy and the
environment since the 1980s. The majority of research and application has pertained to
'on' projects, which focuses on valuation of projects to determine if and when an
investment should be made. Some analysis has been broader than that, such as the use of
real options to analyze ways to spur private investment of thermo-power in Brazil (Wang
2005).37 Analysts have used real options to study traditional and new technologies, on a
range of issues from capacity sizing to resource valuation. Pindyck even uses real
37 Wang 2005 references this piece, authored by Rocha, Moreira and David in 2002.
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options to consider when to implement environmental regulation. The following
considers some of the many relevant and notable examples of real options analysis of
energy and environmental issues.
Dixit and Pindyck discuss the tradeoffs involved in investing in a production facility's
capacity. Large production capacity can make use of economies of scale and help new
facilities move up the learning curve. However, if demand is uncertain, commitment to
large production size can turn out to be a liability. Adding capacity in increments can
increase flexibility and allow investors to respond to market conditions, limiting their
liability if the market turns sour. However, this flexibility comes at the expense of
foregone cost reductions. Real options analysis can help decision-makers optimize their
capacity investments in the face of uncertainty. Such evaluation is useful for new energy
technologies which likely face the need to reduce costs to penetrate an uncertain market.
According to Dixit and Pindyck, the issue of incremental capacity has been used to study
investments in traditional energy supply, like electric utility capacity.38
Real options analysis also has a notable history of helping to value reserves and
determine the appropriate time for their development. The following table from Dixit
and Pindyck shows the option analogy. They draw a connection between the value of an
undeveloped reserve and a call option on a stock. Such analysis may be useful for
modem reserve analysis of traditional and non-traditional sources.
Table 5. Reserves as an Option
Call Option Undeveloped Reserve
Stock price Value of developed reserve
Exercise price Cost of development
Time to expiration Relinquishment requirement
Volatility of stock price Volatility of value of developed reserve
Dividend on stock Net production revenue from developed reserve
less depletion
Source: Dixit & Pindyck 1994, 398.
In addition, Dixit and Pindyck discuss the use of real options to evaluate the appropriate
response to or implementation of environmental policy. They discuss an analysis of
electric utility compliance options for the US Clean Air Act (Dixit & Pindyck 1994, 405).
Such options include relying on allowances, which are of an unknown price but are
flexible, versus investing in mitigation measures, which limits flexibility in the long-run.
A separate discussion and analysis of timing environmental policy also is a good case to
examine the real options thinking as applied to environmental problems. It reveals the
factors involved in evaluating a potentially sunk cost versus a potentially irreversible
damage. They do not derive a quantitative answer but do analytically demonstrate the
tradeoffs.
The application of real options theory to 'in' options is still fairly limited. Work by Lara
Greden in 2004 and 2005 demonstrate the use of real options to formally value flexibility
in architectural design (Greden & Glicksman 2004). Tao Wang analyzes the
3 8 Dixit & Pindyck 1994 cite previous work they did with Sawhill in 1989.
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development of a hypothetical river basin for hydropower. Various design alternatives
include station siting, reservoir capacity, and installed capacity.
Summary
Overall, real options theory provides an array of opportunities for quantitatively assessing
the value and timing of project design and corporate strategy. This is useful for justifying
actions that violate traditional rules of investment. In addition, real options theory
provides an opportunity to actively manage uncertainty rather than defend against it
(Wang 2005). Because it permits one the flexibility to respond to situations as they arise,
real options theory can increase the value of a project. Managers can prepare now to
react in the future, and take advantage of upside potentials while avoiding downside
risks. Table 7 summarizes aspects of real options theory that address investment
decision-making challenges.
Table 6. The Contribution of Real Options
Investment Challenges Contribution of Real Options Theory
Desire to optimize the total returns over time; Real options increase flexibility. While they
Evaluate tradeoffs between now and the future. come at a cost, the 'insurance' they provide
may prove valuable, and increase overall
l______________________ _ project value over time.
Politics of valuation; Choice of an appropriate Some, though not all, of the analytical tools use
discount rate a risk-adjusted interest rate. However, there
l_____________________ _ may still be room for disagreement.
Justify actions in the face of uncertainty Real options theory provides a quantitative way
to analyze options and directly incorporate
uncertainty into decision-making process.
However, current limitations in application methods restrain its usage for a limited set of
projects. Options analyses for example, cannot be directly applied to many engineering
projects, as there is not sufficient associated market data. Borison provides more detail
on assumptions of various real options applications and the limiting factors of applying
the theory, though it does not specify difficulties of analyzing 'in' options. Time lags and
path dependencies are also a real issue that could benefit from a more rigorous method
for analysis. Wang begins to develop methods for analyzing path dependence amongst
'in' options. Finally, while real options theory greatly improves upon the traditional rule
of invest if NPV>0, it may not fully satisfy skeptics, weary of the choice of discount
rates. Table 6 summarizes potential difficulties of applying real options analysis to
investment problems.
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Table 7. Difficulties and Progress in Application of Real Options Theory
Potential Difficulties Study & Progress
Analysts must abide by the assumptions of Adam Borison brings attention to the issue of
financial option theory, which may be difficult assumptions in a 2003 paper (Borison 2003).
for projects with no correlated assets. Researchers continue to study the issue.
The calculations of real options theory can get All mentioned authors acknowledge this fact
complicated quickly, especially in continuous and take care as best as possible to address it.
time models. While computer programming can help,
researchers continue to work on increasing the
accessibility of real options analysis
The issue of path dependence between options Wang analytically assesses path dependence
can complicate the analysis of their benefits, among physically designed options; Smit &
and the understanding of how to create them. Trigeorgis qualitatively discuss dependence
amongst strategic options.
Time lags to develop, implement, and benefit Methods to explore this issue and link it to real
from options can be significant and uncertain. options analysis appear to be limited.
It can be difficult to identify and quantitatively Researchers have made significant progress in
examine the costs of deferring options. this area. Smit & Trigeorgis use game theory
to evaluate strategic costs. Pindyck studies the
issue of irreversible environmental costs
(Pindyck 2002).
System Dynamics
Introduction
Since 1956, Jay W. Forrester has developed the field of system dynamics. Work in the
field continues today under the expertise of many others as well, including MIT's System
Dynamics Group which Forrester founded in the early 1960's. Like real options theory,
system dynamics has been used by researchers to study a number of subjects that range
from urban studies to national energy policy to dispute resolution.
The following introduces the basics of system dynamics and notes it potential benefits
and limitations in the area of clean energy investment. It also discusses examples of the
use of system dynamics to study issues in the realm of energy and environment.
The Theoretical Contribution of System Dynamics
System dynamics is both a tool and an approach to understanding the world. It focuses
on patterns of behavior and the structures that cause these patterns. It examines causal
relationships, through modeling, in a way that accounts for delays, amplifications and
distortions throughout time. By incorporating the means to examine non-linear
relationships, system dynamics models can consider feedbacks among elements of a
system. This allows one to analyze system behavior not immediately apparent by the
behavior of its components.
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While the approaches to using system dynamics may vary by some extent, they all focus
on portraying the structure of a system related to the question at hand via stocks and
flows. Stocks are elements of the system that accrue over time. Flows represent the
information or material flows that contribute to or drain from the stocks (such as water
flowing into a bathtub or draining out). Elements of a system may be physical or non-
measurable items. The use of stocks and flows allows system dynamics models to
represent delays in the system. The use of 'hard' and 'soft' variables helps incorporate
information into the model, which may be difficult to quantify in traditional terms, but
have significant relevance to the issue at hand.
Jay Forrester described the process of modeling and learning with system dynamics via
five steps (Forrester 1999). I summarize these here as follows:
1) Define Goals
2) Describe the Situation (to clarify the nature of factors relevant to the question)
3) Construct the Model (and complete the description of the system)
4) Test the Model (Using simulation on can generate a history of patterns based on
varying inputs)
5) Interpret Results (and go back to adjust as necessary)
The description and representation of a system allows one to test how it responds to
various policies and to explain its behavior. The ultimate goal of system dynamics is to
explain behavior, and develop policies and organizational structure that improve the
system. The following discusses the potential advantages and limitations of system
dynamics in more detail.
Advantages
System dynamics helps users understand the potential behavior of a system despite its
complexity. For example, running various scenarios on a system dynamics models helps
users understand how the system changes over time and what the range of possible
outcomes are. Also, understanding the system in terms of the variable sensitivity and
leverage points can in turn help stakeholders develop strategies to operate productively
within the system or successfully interact with the system.
System dynamics is also a very accessible in that it does not require understanding of
non-linear mathematics to learn about non-linear behavior in systems. System dynamics
employs stocks and flows to develop feedback loop structures, and relies on computer
programs designed specifically for system dynamics to model non-linear structures. The
visual nature of these programs means that several assumptions of the model are visible
to its viewers. Because the modeler develops the non-linear relationship between
components, for example, system dynamics avoids automatically attaching trends to
specific components. Modelers must identify feedback loops, and the interaction of loops
may result in different sorts of behavior (such as exponential growth, oscillation, or
decay).
Overall, system dynamics helps its users think through the consequences of actions, and
leaves it to modelers to build dynamic structures based on observations about the
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system's structure, rather than on projections of historical behavior. It provides a simple
yet profound means of analyzing system behavior.
Limitations
Discussion on the limitations of system dynamics theory appears to be sparse. David
Lane discusses and defends allegations against system dynamics, but mainly at a level of
theoretical assumptions rather than application (Lane 2000). In addition, many of these
allegations seem to derive from misperceptions of the field rather than its actual practice.
George Richardson also offers a critique of the field (Richardson 1996). However, his
remarks focus more on the community than the theory and practice. The following looks
at potential limitations of system dynamics, as collected from a relatively small set of
sources.
According to George Richardson, the adequate validation and confidence of system
dynamic models is a concern for the community. He notes that while Jay Forrester and
researcher Peter Senge published tests to help establish user confidence in models in
1980, work on the subject since has been limited. Furthermore, a separate study found
that many of the tests Forrester and Senge prescribed were not always used in practice
(Richardson 1996). System dynamic projects address a variety of audiences, and the
prescription for what validates a model can vary. Logic, intuition and a shared change in
perspective is sufficient for some projects. The private sector has made a lot of use of
system dynamics modeling. However, as noted earlier, public policy is prone to dispute,
and such validation may not wear well in debates. The use of system dynamics has
tended to focus on business applications or academic research, and validation may be one
barrier for its use in other areas. Nevertheless, because system dynamics does not focus
on outputs as much as behavior, it could potentially avoid contentious discussion over
numbers and focus the debate on structure and accuracy of representation. Forrester
notes the distinction between accuracy and precision, and observes that system dynamics
models seek accuracy rather than precision (Forrester 1999).
Somewhat related to confidence and validation, is a relatively recent debate in the
community about the effectiveness and appropriateness of qualitative versus the
traditional quantitative system dynamic models. George Richardson and Geoff Coyle
provide an introduction to the issue (Richardson 1996 and Coyle 2000). The primary
concern is under what conditions can qualitative models yield reliable insights? Some
practitioners note that forcing quantification of a system that has several uncertain
variables can lead to misleading results, and that the qualitative process can yield
valuable insights. However, others note that model simulation, which requires
quantification, is a necessary step to test one's hypothesis. Richardson sums up the
question to the community as: "What are the wise uses of qualitative mapping
approaches, and what are the conditions that require formal, quantitative modeling"
(Richardson 1996, 7)?
Finally, users of system dynamics should be aware that there is some disagreement within
the system dynamics community about the role of system dynamics for forecasting.
James Lyneis discusses the debate in a 2000 article, and concludes that if forecasts are to
68
be done, system dynamics does it best. However, he also notes Forrester's weariness of
forecasts because of their inaccuracy and potential to mislead managers into taking
counter-effective actions. Much work in system dynamics highlights the problem of
forecasting, including John Sterman's work referenced in this thesis (Sterman 2000).
System Dynamics and Energy and the Environment
The emergence of a market around a new technology is inherently unpredictable.
Breakthroughs in technology or competing technologies, or factors that affect demand are
beyond the control of any single stakeholder. However, modeling is a useful tool to
understand the potential pathways for development of a market under varying scenarios
of uncontrollable factors. In the words of Jay Forrester, the father of system dynamics:
We should look less for prediction of specific actions in the future and more for
enhancing our understanding of the inherent characteristics of the system. There seem to
be good reasons why models cannot be expected to predict specific system condition far
enough into the future to be particularly significant (Forrester 1999, 54).
System dynamics is effective for considering the uncertainties of investment in new clean
energy technologies as it allows one to consider feedbacks between supply and demand
and the stabilities or instabilities in a new market. Furthermore, system dynamics helps
investors understand what factors 'to look for' to see if certain scenarios are playing out.
Thus, investors may be able to take preemptive action rather than react after the system
has already started to change, when they have less ability to change its course.
Also, its focus on dynamic relationships makes system systems an ideal tool for
analyzing time lags in option development, implementation and payoff, and path
dependencies amongst investments. In his 2004 Ph.D. dissertation, Kaare Gether used
system dynamics to explore the issues of path dependency and non-linearity in the
transition to large-scale use of hydrogen (Kaare 2004). He developed a model to evaluate
the dynamic interaction among energy technologies, such as competition between end-
products, which contribute to the overall energy system behavior. In particular, he looks
at path dependence amongst technology options and infrastructure investments, and the
potential for lock-in to particular development pathways. To evaluate the long-term
benefits of new technologies, and to help investors avoid costly mistakes, he uses system
dynamics to develop a way to understand the nature of change within a dynamic,
unpredictable energy system. In addition, he discusses the advantages and limitations of
various forms of modeling, including the method of his approach. His work is highly
relevant to the issues of clean energy investment, beyond the study of hydrogen.
In addition, because the insights from system dynamics are not necessarily numerical
outputs but rather understanding about the working mechanisms of a system, system
dynamics could facilitate strategy discussions while avoiding problems of numerical
valuation. Also, its compatibility with scenario analysis allows it to avoid overdue
reliance on historical data, and avoid imbedded assumptions about the future continuing
as the past. Furthermore, by challenging stakeholder assumptions through modeling
emergent and often unexpected behavior, system dynamics helps change discussion on
what to do from an adversarial debate to a conversation. Modeling can expedite the
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learning process, and because system dynamics allows one to model dynamic, socio-
technical systems, it may be very useful for analysis on clean energy investment
approaches. Table 6 highlights the contribution that system dynamics can have for
addressing investment challenges.
Table 8. The Contribution of System Dynamics
Investment Challenges Contribution of System Dynamics
Desire to optimize the total returns over time; Because options now may affect those that are
Evaluate tradeoffs between now and the future. available later, a long-run view is useful for
optimizing total returns over time. System
dynamics' focus on dynamic relationships
makes it a practical tool to consider both the
past and present. It is an ideal for investigating
time lags and path dependencies over time.
Politics of valuation; Choice of an appropriate The insights from system dynamics are not
discount rate necessarily the numerical outputs, but rather
the understanding of how factors contribute to
unpredictable system behavior. This allows
one to avoid arguments over specific numbers.
In addition, the modeling technique helps
forces transparency as many of the assumptions
of how elements are interrelated are visible in
the model.
Justify actions in the face of uncertainty System dynamics provides a quantitative or
qualitative way to analyze the effects of actions
throughout the system. Also, its compatibility
with scenario analysis makes it suitable for
evaluating actions in the face of uncertainty.
A Potential Decision Framework
The combination of system dynamic and real options has the potential to provide a
practical framework for making clean energy investments in an uncertain future (Please
see Table 9). Real options theory provides a way to value options, which can cultivate
the flexibility to respond to the future as it unfolds. System dynamics is a useful tool for
considering strategic path dependence and time lags.
Pindyck and Dixit refer to the fact that uncertainty of timing, causation, and impact of
environmental risks can encourage deferral of action. However, the opportunity cost of
investment, lag to develop options, and delay between action and effect limit ability to
defer action without consequence. Strategic investments are necessary because options
come at a cost, and path dependencies link past investments to future opportunities. The
combinations of system dynamics and real options may help to understand pathway
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limitations, address uncertainty, and allow action and avoid building to a prediction.
Table 9 summarizes a potential joint framework.
Table 9. Combining Real Options and System Dynamics
71
Design for flexibility rather than rely on prediction
. Examine potential development pathways
given existing constraints (System Dynamics)
Develop options: determine potential,
evaluate worth, and maintain options
(Real Options)
. Act on options: determine decision
thresholds (System Dynamics and Real
Options), enable quick action, and allow
information updates.
Develop ways to move along the possibility frontier
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Chapter 6: Case Study of Gas-to-Liquids Technology
Introduction
The purpose of the case study was to consider the use of system dynamics for
understanding market dynamics. In the case of markets for emergent technologies,
demand and supply costs, affected as they are by many factors, are prone to sudden
changes. The case study examined the potential timing and extent of market growth of
the emerging technology GTL, a proven technology that converts natural gas to low-
sulfur diesel fuel. The complexities of the market make the potential outcomes of
investment-decisions difficult to reason through, let alone predict. The study looked to
system dynamics as a learning tool, and considered system dynamics as an aid in
planning scenarios, which could ultimately help decide which technology to invest in and
when to invest in it.
Several energy companies have invested in GTL projects. However, only a handful of
GTL projects exist, partly because of the large capital expenditures they require, but also
because the product is cost-effective in only a few markets. Over time, due to cost
reductions or changes in demand, the market could potentially grow. The high quality
diesel fuel it produces could potentially help refineries meet increasingly stringent fuel
standards. Also, because GTL produces a liquid product from natural gas, and liquid fuel
transportation is less costly than gas fuel transportation, GTL can make use of gas
reserves previously considered stranded. It is an interesting technology also in that its
fundamental conversion processes are available to other sources and uses. For example,
conversion of biomass to diesel uses relatively the same process as GTL. In addition, the
production of syngas in the GTL process may prove adaptable to hydrogen production.
The characteristics of GTL technology lend it to the study of both 'in' and 'on' real
options. The current system dynamics model would focus more on the 'on' option of
investment. This study did not tie real options analysis with the system dynamics model,
however the potential exists.
The following provides detail on the system dynamics GTL model and offers resulting
observations on the use of system dynamics. The model currently only details the supply
side of the market. Further research on the demand side would help to garner more
understanding about the application of system dynamics to this issue.
Gas-to-Liquids Model
Introduction
GTL is a technology for which many uncertainties are fairly limited. The technology
primarily faces diffusion and adoption uncertainties, rather than uncertainties about
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research and development (R&D) or its ability to address environmental concerns. The
narrow range of uncertainties associated with it makes it an ideal initial case study to
examine the use of system dynamics as a decision-support tool. Further breakthroughs in
the technology would at this point potentially improve adoption. Thus, diffusion and
adoption, and market growth around this technology are largely uncertain.
The model attempts to consider the timing and magnitude of market growth. To do this,
it looks at the dynamic factors in supply costs and demand. So far, the dynamic supply
curve has been completed. Future work would embed a dynamic demand curve in the
model to examine the feedback between supply and demand, and the effect of external
factors such as technology breakthroughs and reserve availability on market growth.
Figure 9 illustrates the patterns of behavior for GTL demand and supply that the model
seeks to investigate.
Figure 9. Expected Patterns of Behavior
I1
GTL Cost0
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Market Share
Market Share
Disruption Time - Time
Source: Jessica Harrison, Tammy Greenlaw, Kate Parrot, 2005.
Supply
The supply portion of the model consists of fixed relationships between costs, and two
dynamic components - construction learning and operation learning. Technology
breakthroughs are dynamic in the sense that they can be programmed to occur at various
times as the model runs. Furthermore, costs associated with natural gas reserves are
endogenous and may be programmed to vary over time. Thus, they are fixed unless
externally adjusted. The decision to invest is based on a continuous net present value
calculation over previously outputted profits, to model stakeholder decision-making.
The following takes a more detailed look at the supply portion of the model, broken out
into four sections: operation learning, construction learning, the decision to invest, and
aggregated costs. Figure 10 highlights key elements of the overall model.
OPERATION LEARNING: The operation learning unit represents the phenomenon that as
plant production increases, plant managers are able to operate the plant more efficiently
due to increased knowledge. The increase in management efficiency in turn lowers unit
operating costs, and decreases total costs. A 'knowledge diffusion' factor accounts for
the fact that not all knowledge will circulate to other facilities. As the cost of supply
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decrease, suppliers are able to decrease price, which can increase the quantity demanded
and spur increased production.
CONSTRUCTION LEARNING: Similar to the operation learning unit, construction learning
accounts for the fact that as more plants are built, experience with designing and
constructing plants increases. As experience with construction increases, the error rate
and the time to build decreases, lowering per unit construction costs. Again, a
'knowledge diffusion' factor accounts for the fact that not all knowledge will circulate to
other facilities. In addition, the model takes into consideration the fact that less learning
occurs if facilities are simultaneously constructed versus constructed in parallel. This is
incorporated into a 'simultaneity factor.' Also, decreases in construction costs lower the
cost of supply. As the cost of supply decrease, suppliers are able to decrease price, which
can increase the quantity demanded and spur increased construction.
DECISION TO INVEST: The decision to invest is modeled as a calculation of unmet
demand, and net present value. Unmet demand is determined by the quantity demanded
at a given price, minus existing capacity and the capacity already in construction. The
net present value of investments is calculated as a weighted average of historical profits
discounted as an annuity over a fixed time period. If the net present value and unmet
demand are positive, and unmet demand is larger than facility capacity, then a decision to
start construction of additional facilities is made.
COSTS: The model calculates an aggregate unit cost from a unit capital cost and a unit
operating cost. The capital costs consist of a cost to permit, commission, and build a
facility, transportation infrastructure costs per facility, and reserve right costs per facility.
These are then amortized over an assumed facility life and production to derive a unit
capital cost. Unit operating costs are calculated from a unit transportation cost and a unit
production cost.
The model assumes an average operating and capital cost per facility. However, it allows
these base costs to be adjusted over time according to the average characteristics of
aggregate natural gas reserves. Such characteristics include onshore versus offshore,
associated or non-associated with oil, which affect construction, transportation and
production costs, and the geography of the reserves, which affects construction costs and
transportation costs.
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Comparison of the model outputs to the reference mode demonstrates that the supply
portion of the model behaves as expected. Costs decrease incrementally over time due to
learning, unless interrupted by a technology breakthrough. The output of the model,
however, is highly sensitive to the inputs of learning curves and demand curves. For
example, the shapes of the operation and construction learning curves directly determine
the size and shape of cost reductions. Given the sensitivity of GTL costs to the learning
effects, and the shape of the demand curve, the insights from the model outputs are
limited in terms of predictability. However, dynamics are still valuable to consider. As
noted above, the model may be very useful for generating scenarios to examine the
characteristics of uncertainties.
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Figure 11. Comparison of Expected Behavior to Model Output
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Source: Jessica Harrison, Tammy Greenlaw, Kate Parrot, 2005.
The initial bend in both the top and the bottom curves illustrate decreases in cost from
'operation learning' as cumulative production increases. The cost reductions diminish
over time, representing a limit to the benefits of operation learning. The bottom curve
displays the cost reductions from a breakthrough. A breakthrough in the model is
represented as a decrease in the size-to-capacity ratio of a plant. This may occur if a
plant is able to reduce its footprint and produce the same output, or if a facility improves
its efficiency to produce more output for the same facility size. Reducing the size-to-
capacity ratio reduces per unit capital costs, lowering overall aggregate cost.
The only dynamic interactions that occur in the supply portion of the model are
construction and operation learning. This is in part because demand is currently
exogenous to the model. If the demand curve were endogenous to the model, one would
be able to consider if and when demand would be large enough at a given price to allow
these learning effects to operate. For example, if demand were too small at a given price
to justify building more than one facility, no construction learning effects would occur,
and operation learning would be very limited. If no breakthrough occurs, and learning is
limited, costs may not drop significantly enough to increase demand and warrant the
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construction of another facility. Thus, the construction and operation learning is
prevented from occurring.
Demand
GTL may be used as a diesel end-fuel, or as way to dilute diesel fuels to allow them to
meet sulfur standards. Demand is currently static in the model. However, there are many
interesting dynamics to demand that are worth considering. Initially, one would expect a
niche market to develop from refineries or from luxury fuel consumers. Nevertheless,
there are several factors at play into the development of demand. These include the
availability of GTL substitutes, environmental regulations that decrease the sulfur content
of fuels, and increasingly 'dirty' oil reserves. All affect either the quantity demanded at a
given price, or the price of competing products. In addition, the remoteness of natural
gas reserves and the ability to take advantage of associated gas affects the attractiveness
of GTL.39
Resulting Observations on System Dynamics
The strength of system dynamics is that it allows one to examine the uncertain timing and
sensitivities of the market growth of a new technology. In addition, though the GTL case
study model was not explicit about the sources of technology breakthrough, the model
could potentially detail areas of possible breakthrough, and examine the sensitivities of
breakthroughs to cost. This would be a useful way to focus R&D allocations. Like other
models, however, this system dynamic model's prediction accuracy is limited by its
assumptions and inputs. Scenario development is an important task to fully learn from
the model. The task of developing scenarios is not a simple one and analysis is limited
by the ability to generate useful scenarios. However, the combination of system
dynamics and scenario analysis could improve understanding in an area currently
shrouded by uncertainty. Further research is necessary to gather input about the potential
of system dynamics to aid in investment decision-making and design.
39 Generally, as refinery capacity decreases, the price of diesel increases and the attractiveness of GTL as
an end use fuel increases. Also, as clean oil availability decreases or fuel standards increase, refinery
demand is likely to increase, unless refineries develop and implement new processing techniques.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
Rising concerns about energy security and climate change are prompting change in
energy systems worldwide. But how should stakeholders react? What timing and types
of investment are appropriate? Should stakeholders even attempt to change course given
the uncertainties about the timing and impact of climate change and the uncertainty about
the ability of various energy sources to meet our needs?
The original motivation for this thesis was to evaluate the advantages of taking early
action to address energy and environment concerns such as climate change. However, a
literature review of current challenges and approaches revealed that the question is
difficult to objectively assess in a quantitative manner. Disputes in the policy arena and
varied approaches by industry about the stringency and timing of action to address
climate change intimate such troubles. With the thought that new tools might improve
upon current strategy, this thesis went on to examine the benefits and limitations of a real
options approach and system dynamics. It concludes that these tools may be a good start
to addressing some of these issues and calls for more research on ways to apply real
options and system dynamics. Having found limited information on the current strategic-
planning tools in use, this thesis also suggests further research with industry and
policymakers to learn more about the specific tools and processes they use to strategize
their policies and investments. The following summarizes research conclusions.
Decision-Making Difficulties
Uncertainties of environmental risks, such as timing, causation, and impact, encourage
deferral of action. However, the ability to defer without consequence is limited due to
constraints in investments, development lags, and delays between action and effect.
Options cultivate the flexibility to respond to uncertain environmental risks. However,
strategic investments are necessary because of option costs, path dependencies linking
past investment to future opportunities, and time lags to develop, implement, and realize
the benefits of an option. Making strategic investment requires:
Examining potential pathways given constraints;
Developing options: determining their potential, evaluating their worth and
maintaining them; and
Acting on options: determining decision thresholds, enabling quick action, and
updating information.
In order to cope with uncertainties, one may design for flexibility rather than predict a
future and build to that future. However, the value of flexibility must be weighed against
other considerations, such as competitive strategy. System dynamics and real options
may help to understand transition pathways, address uncertainty, and allow action while
avoiding picking a prediction. The following notes potential strengths and weaknesses of
system dynamics in addressing the initial question of investments in clean energy
technology.
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Tools Summary
Real Options
A real options approach allows one to avoid prediction and consider one's future under a
range of possible outcomes. However, it is a precarious tool given the assumptions it
requires and its current lack of focus on time delays or investments for reasons of
competitive advantage (e.g. game theory). A Real options approach could potentially
incentivize adoption of technologies that improve environmental performance by
reducing the down side of investment and providing fallback options. System dynamics
and scenario analysis may be a useful input to real options analysis. It could provide
insight into what items to monitor in order to know when to implement a real option, or
what sort of timing might be appropriate for implementation of an option. In addition, it
could potentially generate uncertainty distributions to feed into real options analysis.
However, further research is needed in this area.
System Dynamics
The strength of system dynamics is that it allows one to examine the uncertain timing and
sensitivities of the market growth of a new technology. Like other models, however, this
system dynamics model's prediction accuracy is limited by its assumptions and inputs.
Scenario development is an important task to fully learn from the model. The task of
developing scenarios is not a simple one and analysis is limited by the ability to generate
useful scenarios. However, the combination of system dynamics and scenario analysis
could improve understanding in an area currently shrouded by uncertainty.
This thesis helps answer the question why the cost of delaying investments is difficult to
analyze. Furthermore, it offers an introduction to how one might best go about
developing the tools and methods necessary to address this question. The area of clean
energy investment decision-making is a complicated one, the outcome of which as
serious implications. It is a rich field of study, and further research in this area could help
innovate on decision-making tools and clarify the ambiguity of decision-making
regarding urgent yet elusive energy issues.
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Appendices
Appendix I: EA Shared Goals
Available online at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/about/sharedgoals.htm
"The 26 Member countries of the International Energy Agency (IEA) seek to create the
conditions in which the energy sectors of their economies can make the fullest possible
contribution to sustainable economic development and the well-being of their people and
of the environment. In formulating energy policies, the establishment of free and open
markets is a fundamental point of departure, though energy security and environmental
protection need to be given particular emphasis by governments. IEA countries recognise
the significance of increasing global interdependence in energy. They therefore seek to
promote the effective operation of international energy markets and encourage dialogue
with all participants.
In order to secure their objectives they therefore aim to create a policy framework
consistent with the following goals:
Diversity, efficiency and flexibility within the energy sector are basic conditions for
longer-term energy security: the fuels used within and across sectors and the sources of
those fuels should be as diverse as practicable. Non-fossil fuels, particularly nuclear and
hydro power, make a substantial contribution to the energy supply diversity of IEA
countries as a group.
Energy systems should have the ability to respond promptly and flexibly to energy
emergencies. In some cases this requires collective mechanisms and action: IEA
countries co-operate through the Agency in responding jointly to oil supply emergencies.
The environmentally sustainable provision and use of energy is central to the
achievement of these shared goals. Decision-makers should seek to minimise the adverse
environmental impacts of energy activities, just as environmental decisions should take
account of the energy consequences. Government interventions should where practicable
have regard to the Polluter Pays Principle.
More environmentally acceptable energy sources need to be encouraged and developed.
Clean and efficient use of fossil fuels is essential. The development of economic non-
fossil sources is also a priority. A number of IEA members wish to retain and improve
the nuclear option for the future, at the highest available safety standards, because nuclear
energy does not emit carbon dioxide. Renewable sources will also have an increasingly
important contribution to make.
Improved energy efficiency can promote both environmental protection and energy
security in a cost-effective manner. There are significant opportunities for greater energy
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efficiency at all stages of the energy cycle from production to consumption. Strong
efforts by Governments and all energy users are needed to realise these opportunities.
Continued research, development and market deployment of new and improved energy
technologies make a critical contribution to achieving the objectives outlined above.
Energy technology policies should complement broader energy policies. International co-
operation in the development and dissemination of energy technologies, including
industry participation and co-operation with non-Member countries, should be
encouraged.
Undistorted energy prices enable markets to work efficiently. Energy prices should not be
held artificially below the costs of supply to promote social or industrial goals. To the
extent necessary and practicable, the environmental costs of energy production and use
should be reflected in prices.
Free and open trade and a secure framework for investment contribute to efficient energy
markets and energy security. Distortions to energy trade and investment should be
avoided.
Co-operation among all energy market participants helps to improve information and
understanding, and encourage the development of efficient, environmentally acceptable
and flexible energy systems and markets worldwide. These are needed to help promote
the investment, trade and confidence necessary to achieve global energy security and
environmental objectives."
The "Shared Goals" were adopted by EA Ministers at their 4 June 1993 meeting in Paris.
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Appendix II: Climate Change Uncertainties
Source: IPCC, Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers,
2001. Available online at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/un/syreng/spm.pdf
Table SPM3 I Robust findinas and key uncertainties'
Robust Findting
Obsenr ations show Earth's surthace is warming.
(ilobaills. 1990s, ,cry lik s annicst decade iln
instrunmental record Figure SPM- l Ob). 1j94 .S
Atnospheri concentrations ofiaini anthropogenic
greenhou.e gases (CO, (Figure SPM-I Oa). CH4 .
N2 0. and tropospheric 03) increased substantially
since the yescar I 750. 1 ' Q.1 I1
Somne greenhouse gases have long lilitinies e.g..
C02, N20, and PFCs). Q9.101
Most of observed warmining over lst 50 years
likely due to increases in greenhouse gas
coincenltrations lue to hunian activilies. Q';SI
CO, concentrations increasing over 21 st century
virtuallv certain to be mainvly due to olbssil-futel
emissions (Figure SPiM-IOa). IQ.1 11
Stabilization of atmospheric CO2 concentrations
at 450. 650. or 1,000 ppm would require global
anthropogenic CO, emissions to drop below year
1990 levels. within a few decades, about a century,
or about 2 centuries, respectively, and continue to
decrease steadily thereafter it) a small fraction of
current emissions. Emissions would peak in about
I to 2 decades (450 ppm ) and roughly a century
( 1,000 ppm) Ironi the present. [(9.311
For most SRES scenarios, SO, emissions
(precursor for sulfate aerosols are lower in the
year 2100 compared with year 2000. [Q19. I (11
Global average surflace temperature during 2Ist
century rising at rates very likely without
precedent duri ring last 0.0)00 years I I-igurc SPM1 -
I Ob). I .11 
Nearly all land areas very Ilikely to warmn more
than the global average. withl more hot days aInd
heat waves and ewer cold days and cold waves.
19. .131
Rise in sea level during 21st century, that will
continue for urther centuries. 1{1. 151
Hydrological cycle more intense. Increase in
globally averaged precipitation and more intense
precipitation events vcry likely v over many areas.
JQ9.9141
Increased summer drying and associated risk of
drought likely over most miid-latitude continental
interiors. Q9. 141
('limate chiange andl
att ribution
Future eimissiolis and
concenlrationls o'
greenhouse gases and
aerosols basted oin mtdels
tantd projections with the
SRES and sabilization
scenarios
Flat ure chntiges in global
altmld regional limate
h.ed on modl'el
pl)n.ijectilns with SRES
scenairios
Kqe tUcertinies
Magnitude and character of natural climate
variability. QOY'.;
Climate forcings due to natural factors and
anthropogenic aerosols particularly indirect
effects). 9.81
Relating regional trends to anthropogenic clinliate
change. lOt}.8 & (L22t
Assumptions underlying the wide ranigeb of SRES
emissions scenarios relating to economic growth.
technological progress, population growth. and
governance structures (lead to largest uncertainties
in projections}. Inadequate emission scenarios br
ozone and aerosol prectursors. Q,.111
Faciors in miodeling oft carbon cycle including
etlects of clinmiate feedbacks.b It,).I 1jI
Assumptions associated with a wide rangeC of
SRES scenarios. as above. I'.9 1)[1
Factors associated with modeIel projvectionsc. in
particular climnate sensiivity. clirnate forcing, and
feedback processes espe ciaily those involving
water vapor, clouds, rid aerosols (inc ludlidng
aerosol indirect eflicts). 1(4. til
Understanding the probability distribution
associmated with temperat tire a d sea-level
projections. I Q0Q.1 
The mechanisms, quantifticalion, tiuie scales, arnd
likelihoodls associated wvith large-scale abruptinon-
linear changcs (e.g.. ocean thrcmihalinc
circulationi. 10(9.16[
Capabilities of models on regional scales
(especially regarding precipitationi leadin to
inconsistencies in model pirjection.s and
difficulties in quantification on local and rgional
scales. 9. 161
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Tabl. SPM-3 I PhRobust findinns and ke unceirtainties a
Robust iintdings
Projected climate change will have beneficial and
uadverse lf:cts on oth environmental and socio-
economic systemis. but the larger the changes and
the rate. ol change in climate, ithe more the adverse
eflects predominate. Q9. I 1
ie adverse impacts of clinmte change are expected
to all displroprtionately uipon developing countries
and tl e poor persOns w ithin c untrics. 1( 9,.211
Ecosyvstemns and species are vulnerable to climate
change and other stresses (as illustrated by observed
impacts of recmnt regional temperature changes)
and some will be irreversibly damnaged or lost.
9t,9.1ll
In somie mid- to high latitudes, plant productivity
(trees ad some agricultural crops) would increase
with small increases in temperature. Plant
productivits would decrease in most regions of the
world for waming beyond a few C. I Q9.18
Mariny physical sstems are vulnerable to climate
change ( e.g.. the impact ofcoastal storrt surges
will be exacerbated by sea-level rise. and glaciers
and permafrost will continue retreat). I. 18
Greenhouse gas emission reduction (mitigation }
IactiolIs would lCss.cn the pre>urcs on natural and
humian systeCnts firon climate change 11.28i
Mitigation has costs that vary between regions and
sectors. Substantial techinological and other
opportunities exist for lowvering these costs.
Efficient cmissions trading also reduces costs bor
those participating in the trading. 1Q9.31 &
.9..t5-.1 lt
lEmissions constraints on Annex I countries have
well-established. albeit varied. "spill-over effects
on non-Annex I countries. !Qt.321
National mitigation responses to climate change
can be morc ell;ctive if deployed as a portfolio of
policies to limit or reduce net greenhouse gas
emissions. 1()9.351
Adaptation has the potential to reduce adverse
efkcts of climate change and can often produce
imnmediate ancillary benefits, but will not prevent
all damages. j99.241
.\daptation an complement miitiation in a cost-
effective strategy it) reduce climate change risks:
together they can contribute to sustainable
development objectives. IQ9.4tl
Inlcrtia in the iteractinig clim ate. ecologictl, and
SOClo-Cconl'lm11 ssents is a Lmajor reason why
anticipatory adaptation ad mitigaton actions are
beneficial. t9.39l
Regimial and global
impacts of changes in
mean eclimate and
extrelimes
(:sts aiId beiefits 1of
in1iliation atid
ada;tlitiotll optionis
Ae) Lncerainies
Reliability uf local or regional detail in projections
tof eli ale ciange . spec ally Cl inliate Cxtr'llnics.
09.'22)
Assessing and predicting rsponse of ecological.
social (e.g.. inipac of vector- and water-borne
diseases), and econiomic systems to the combined
cfftcl of climate charge and other stlresses such as
land-use change. local pollution. etc.t5- 22
Identificatitn, quantification. antd valuation of
damages associated withli climate change. . I.(9.22. & 99.201
Understanding the interactions between climate
change and other cln ironlllcntual issues. and tIhC
related sotciO-ectlt111ic iplilicutions. (Y)'.41
TDe future price of cnergy, and the cost and
availability of low-emissions technology.
IQ4.33-.341
Identificatioln of icalns It) remnlove barriers that
impede adoption of low-emission technologies.
anid estimation of the costs ofovercotiring such
barriers. JQ9..35 
Quantification of costs of unplanned and
unexpected mlit gation actiirs with sudden short-
term effects. 1(9.381
Quantification of' nitigation cost esimnates
generated by di tTrent approachetics (e.g., botttl-up
vs. top-down}. inc luding ancillary benefits.
technological change. and ffects on sectolrs and
regions 119)9.35
Qualntificatiin oft adaptation costs. '.25 
a In this rlprt. a rbustfinding tfor climate changc is defined s one that holds tinder a variety of approaches. methods, models. and
assumptions and one that is expected t b' relatively unaflected by uncertainties. ev uncertaities in this context arc those that. if
reduced, may lead to new ad robust findings in relation to the qLuestions ofthis report. This table provides examplecs and is not an
exhaustive list.
b Accounting for these above uncertainties leads to a range of CO2 concenlrations in the year 21 X) between about 490 and 1.250 ppm.
C Accountin fr thes above uncertainties leads to a range for globaly averaged surface temperature increase. 1990-2100, of 1.4 to
5.8'Ct Figure SPM-I Ob) and of globally averaged sea-level rise of 0.09 to 0.88 m.
85
.
Appendix III: Letters Regarding Global Warming Studies
House Energy and Commerce Committee Letter Requesting
Information Regarding Global Warming Studies
The House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair, Congressman Joe Barton of Texas,
sent letters to the National Science Foundation, the IPCC, and Dr. Michael Mann and co-
authors Drs. Malcolm K. Hughes and Raymond S. Bradley, requesting information about
their research or use of research on global warming. The following letter is that
addressed to climate change scientist, Michael Mann. A copy of this letter, along with
the others are available online at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Letters/06232005 1570.htm
June 23, 2005
Dr. Michael Mann
Assistant Professor
Department of Environmental Sciences
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA 22904
Dear Dr. Mann:
Questions have been raised, according to a February 14, 2005 article in The Wall
Street Journal, about the significance of methodological flaws and data errors in your
studies of the historical record of temperatures and climate change. We understand that
these studies of temperature proxy records (tree rings, ice cores, corals, etc.) formed the
basis for a new finding in the 2001 United Nation's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) Third Assessment Report (TAR). This finding - that the increase in 20th
century northern hemisphere temperatures is "likely to have been the largest of any
century during the past 1,000 years" and that the "1990s was the warmest decade and
1998 the warmest year" - has since been referenced widely and has become a prominent
feature of the public debate surrounding climate change policy.
However, in recent peer-reviewed articles in Science, Geophysical Research
Letters, and Energy & Environment, researchers question the results of this work. As
these researchers find, based on the available information, the conclusions concerning
temperature histories - and hence whether warming in the 20th century is actually
unprecedented - cannot be supported by the Mann et al. studies cited in the TAR. In
addition, we understand from the February 14 Journal and these other reports that
researchers have failed to replicate the findings of these studies, in part because of
problems with the underlying data and the calculations used to reach the conclusions.
Questions have also been raised concerning the sharing and dissemination of the data and
86
methods used to perform the studies. For example, according to the January 2005 Energy
& Environment, such information necessary to replicate the analyses in the studies has
not been made fully available to researchers upon request.
The concerns surrounding these studies reflect upon the quality and transparency
of federally funded research and of the IPCC review process - two matters of particular
interest to the Committee. For example, one concern relates to whether IPCC review has
been sufficiently independent. We understand that you were a lead author of the IPCC
chapter that assessed and reported your own studies, and that two study co-authors were
also contributing authors to this very same chapter. Given the prominence these studies
were accorded in the IPCC TAR and your position and role in that process, we seek to
learn more about the facts and circumstances that led to acceptance and prominent use of
this work in the IPCC TAR and to understand what this controversy indicates about the
data quality of key IPCC studies.
As you know, sharing data and research results is a basic tenet of open scientific
inquiry, providing a means to judge the reliability of scientific claims. The ability to
replicate a study, as the National Research Council has noted, is typically the gold
standard by which the reliability of claims is judged. Given the questions reported about
data access surrounding these studies, we also seek to learn whether obligations
concerning the sharing of information developed or disseminated with federal support
have been appropriately met.
In light of the Committee's jurisdiction over energy policy and certain
environmental issues, the Committee must have full and accurate information when
considering matters relating to climate change policy. We open this review because this
dispute surrounding your studies bears directly on important questions about the federally
funded work upon which climate studies rely and the quality and transparency of
analyses used to support the IPCC assessment process. With the IPCC currently working
to produce a fourth assessment report, addressing questions of quality and transparency in
the process and underlying analyses supporting that assessment, both scientific and
economic, are of utmost importance if Congress is eventually going to make policy
decisions drawing from this work.
To assist us as we begin this review, and pursuant to Rules X and XI of the U.S.
House of Representatives, please provide the following information requested below on
or before July 11, 2005:
1. Your curriculum vitae, including, but not limited to, a list of all studies relating
to climate change research for which you were an author or co-author and the
source of funding for those studies.
2. List all financial support you have received related to your research, including,
but not limited to, all private, state, and federal assistance, grants, contracts
(including subgrants or subcontracts), or other financial awards or honoraria.
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3. Regarding all such work involving federal grants or funding support under
which you were a recipient of funding or principal investigator, provide all
agreements relating to those underlying grants or funding, including, but not
limited to, any provisions, adjustments, or exceptions made in the agreements
relating to the dissemination and sharing of research results.
4. Provide the location of all data archives relating to each published study for
which you were an author or co-author and indicate: (a) whether this information
contains all the specific data you used and calculations your performed, including
such supporting documentation as computer source code, validation information,
and other ancillary information, necessary for full evaluation and application of
the data, particularly for another party to replicate your research results; (b) when
this information was available to researchers; (c) where and when you first
identified the location of this information; (d) what modifications, if any, you
have made to this information since publication of the respective study; and (e) if
necessary information is not fully available, provide a detailed narrative
description of the steps somebody must take to acquire the necessary information
to replicate your study results or assess the quality of the proxy data you used.
5. According to The Wall Street Journal, you have declined to release the exact
computer code you used to generate your results. (a) Is this correct? (b) What
policy on sharing research and methods do you follow? (c) What is the source of
that policy? (d) Provide this exact computer code used to generate your results.
6. Regarding study data and related information that is not publicly archived, what
requests have you or your co-authors received for data relating to the climate
change studies, what was your response, and why?
7. The authors McIntyre and McKitrick (Energy & Environment, Vol. 16, No. 1,
2005) report a number of errors and omissions in Mann et. al., 1998. Provide a
detailed narrative explanation of these alleged errors and how these may affect the
underlying conclusions of the work, including, but not limited to answers to the
following questions:
a. Did you run calculations without the bristlecone pine series referenced
in the article and, if so, what was the result?
b. Did you or your co-authors calculate temperature reconstructions using
the referenced "archived Gaspe tree ring data," and what were the results?
c. Did you calculate the R2 statistic for the temperature reconstruction,
particularly for the 15th Century proxy record calculations and what were
the results?
d. What validation statistics did you calculate for the reconstruction prior
to 1820, and what were the results?
e. How did you choose particular proxies and proxy series?
8. Explain in detail your work for and on behalf of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, including, but not limited to: (a) your role in the Third
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Assessment Report; (b) the process for review of studies and other information,
including the dates of key meetings, upon which you worked during the TAR
writing and review process; (c) the steps taken by you, reviewers, and lead
authors to ensure the data underlying the studies forming the basis for key
findings of the report were sound and accurate; (d) requests you received for
revisions to your written contribution; and (e) the identity of the people who
wrote and reviewed the historical temperature-record portions of the report,
particularly Section 2.3, "Is the Recent Warming Unusual?"
Thank you for your assistance. If you have any questions, please contact Peter
Spencer of the Majority Committee staff at (202) 226-2424.
Sincerely,
Joe Barton Ed Whitfield
Chairman Chairman Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations
cc: The Honorable John Dingell, Ranking Member
The Honorable Bart Stupak, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
AAAS Letter to House Energy and Commerce Committee Regarding
Request for Information About Global Warming Studies
The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) sent a letter to the
House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair, Congressman Joe Barton of Texas, in
response to their request for the information about research on global warming. The
letter is available online at http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2005/07141etter.pdf.
July 13, 2005
The Honorable Joe Barton, Chair
Committee on Energy and Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On behalf of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS),
the world's largest general science society and the publisher of the peer-reviewed journal,
Science, I am writing to express deep concern about letters recently sent by the
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Committee to several scientists, including Drs. Michael S. Mann, Malcom K. Hughes,
and Raymond S. Bradley, regarding their research in climate science.
We very much appreciate the Committee's interest in this important field. Your
letters, however, in their request for highly detailed information regarding not only the
scientists' recent studies but also their life's work, give the impression of a search for
some basis on which to discredit these particular scientists and findings, rather than a
search for understanding. With all respect, we question whether this approach is good for
the processes by which scientific findings on topics relevant to public policy are
generated and used.
Studies cited in the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) have been subjected to multiple levels of scientific peer review, first in achieving
publication in a peer-reviewed scientific journal (which is a prerequisite for consideration
by the IPCC) and then in multiple layers of the IPCC process itself. Where contending
interpretations arise, these continue to be properly pursued over time in the peer-reviewed
scientific literature and in the frequent assessments of such literature by groups such as
the National Academy of Sciences and the IPCC.
While we fully understand that the policy-making functions of the Congress
require integrating the best available understanding of relevant science with other
considerations, we think it would be unfortunate if Congress tried to become a participant
in the scientific peer-review process itself. More than that, we are concerned that
establishing a practice of aggressive Congressional inquiry into the complete professional
histories of scientists whose findings may bear on policy in ways that some find
unpalatable could have a chilling effect on the willingness of scientists to conduct work
on policy-relevant scientific questions.
In the particular case of the work of Drs. Mann, Hughes, and Bradley on the
temperature history of the Earth, these studies have been peer-reviewed in connection
with their publication in Nature, Geophysical Research Letters, Science, and elsewhere.
The papers in question have described the methodology as well as the findings, and
additional information has been provided in on-line supplements to the papers (an
increasingly common practice in the science community).
As you state in your letter, the studies by Mann et al. were part of the basis for
findings presented in the IPCC report: Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. This
having happened is a reflection of the Mann et al. work's passing muster in further layers
of peer review within the IPCC process itself. The IPCC does not conduct research on its
own, instead engaging top scientists from around the world to assess the current state of
knowledge as reflected in articles published in peer-reviewed journals. There were more
than 100 authors of Chapter 2 in the IPCC's 2001 "Scientific Basis" report, where the
Mann et al. work was cited, and two extensive rounds of review by scientific experts and
government representatives were conducted after those authors agreed on their initial
draft. It should be added that the Mann et al. work was far from the only basis for the
conclusion that Northern Hemisphere temperatures in the last part of the 20th century
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were likely the warmest in 1000 years; a variety of independent lines of evidence,
summarized in a number of peer-reviewed publications, were cited in support of this
conclusion.
It is true that studies that challenge the findings of Mann et al. have subsequently
been published, as have other studies that support the Mann et al. findings. This point-
counterpoint process is how science normally progresses. There is nothing about the way
it is proceeding in this particular case that ought to arouse Congressional concern about
federally-funded climate science or climate science in general. The peer-reviewed
literature on Earth's temperature history will again be reviewed in the 2007 IPCC report.
Congress indeed has an important role in oversight of federally funded research,
especially that which contributes to public policy. That role properly includes attention to
both priorities and productivity in such research, but as to quality, the best guide for the
Congress is the fate of federally funded research in the peer-reviewed literature and in the
assessments of that literature by scientific bodies. As to the mechanisms for distilling
from the available scientific knowledge the insights needed for the Congress to discharge
its policy-making responsibilities, we believe that the tried and true approaches of
hearings, meetings with individual experts in the field, and studies commissioned from
the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Research Service, and relevant
Executive Branch agencies remain superior to the approach taken in your recent round of
letters to climate scientists.
My colleagues and I would be pleased to discuss these matters with you and your
staff should you so desire. Please contact Joanne Carney, director of the AAAS Center
for Science, Technology and Congress (202 326 6798 orjcarney@aaas.org) if you have
questions or would like additional information.
Sincerely,
Alan I. Leshner
cc: The Honorable John Dingell, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Energy and Commerce
The Honorable Ed Whitfield, Chair, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
The Honorable Bart Stupak, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations
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Appendix IV: Joint Science Academies' Statement
The following statement was made by eleven of the world's national science academies
on June 7th, 2005. The eleven academies were from: Brazil, Canada, China, France,
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The statement is also available online at http://nationalacademies.org/onpi/06072005.pdf
Joint Science Academies' Statement: Global Response to Climate
Change
Climate change is real
There will always be uncertainty in understanding a system as complex as the world's
climate. However there is now strong evidence that significant global warming is
occurring'. The evidence comes from direct measurements of rising surface air
temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures and from phenomena such as increases
in average global sea levels, retreating glaciers, and changes to many physical and
biological systems. It is likely that most of the warming in recent decades can be
attributed to human activities (IPCC 2001)2. This warming has already led to changes in
the Earth's climate.
The existence of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is vital to life on Earth - in their
absence average temperatures would be about 30 centigrade degrees lower than they are
today. But human activities are now causing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases - including carbon dioxide, methane, tropospheric ozone, and nitrous oxide - to
rise well above pre-industrial levels. Carbon dioxide levels have increased from 280 ppm
in 1750 to over 375 ppm today - higher than any previous levels that can be reliably
measured (i.e. in the last 420,000 years). Increasing greenhouse gases are causing
temperatures to rise; the Earth's surface warmed by approximately 0.6 centigrade degrees
over the twentieth century. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
projected that the average global surface temperatures will continue to increase to
between 1.4 centigrade degrees and 5.8 centigrade degrees above 1990 levels, by 2100.
Reduce the causes of climate change
The scientific understanding of climate change is now sufficiently clear to justify nations
taking prompt action. It is vital that all nations identify cost-effective steps that they can
take now, to contribute to substantial and long-term reduction in net global greenhouse
gas emissions.
Action taken now to reduce significantly the build-up of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere will lessen the magnitude and rate of climate change. As the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) recognises, a lack of full
scientific certainty about some aspects of climate change is not a reason for delaying an
immediate response that will, at a reasonable cost, prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.
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As nations and economies develop over the next 25 years, world primary energy demand
is estimated to increase by almost 60%. Fossil fuels, which are responsible for the
majority of carbon dioxide emissions produced by human activities, provide valuable
resources for many nations and are projected to provide 85% of this demand (EA 2004)3.
Minimising the amount of this carbon dioxide reaching the atmosphere presents a huge
challenge. There are many potentially cost-effective technological options that could
contribute to stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations. These are at various stages of
research and development. However barriers to their broad deployment still need to be
overcome.
Carbon dioxide can remain in the atmosphere for many decades. Even with possible
lowered emission rates we will be experiencing the impacts of climate change throughout
the 21st century and beyond. Failure to implement significant reductions in net
greenhouse gas emissions now, will make the job much harder in the future.
Prepare for the consequences of climate change
Major parts of the climate system respond slowly to changes in greenhouse gas
concentrations. Even if greenhouse gas emissions were stabilised instantly at today's
levels, the climate would still continue to change as it adapts to the increased emission of
recent decades. Further changes in climate are therefore unavoidable. Nations must
prepare for them.
The projected changes in climate will have both beneficial and adverse effects at the
regional level, for example on water resources, agriculture, natural ecosystems and
human health. The larger and faster the changes in climate, the more likely it is that
adverse effects will dominate. Increasing temperatures are likely to increase the
frequency and severity of weather events such as heat waves and heavy rainfall.
Increasing temperatures could lead to large-scale effects such as melting of large ice
sheets (with major impacts on low-lying regions throughout the world). The IPCC
estimates that the combined effects of ice melting and sea water expansion from ocean
warming are projected to cause the global mean sea-level to rise by between 0.1 and 0.9
metres between 1990 and 2100. In Bangladesh alone, a 0.5 metre sea-level rise would
place about 6 million people at risk from flooding.
Developing nations that lack the infrastructure or resources to respond to the impacts of
climate change will be particularly affected. It is clear that many of the world's poorest
people are likely to suffer the most from climate change. Long-term global efforts to
create a more healthy, prosperous and sustainable world may be severely hindered by
changes in the climate.
The task of devising and implementing strategies to adapt to the consequences of climate
change will require worldwide collaborative inputs from a wide range of experts,
including physical and natural scientists, engineers, social scientists, medical scientists,
those in the humanities, business leaders and economists.
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Conclusion
We urge all nations, in the line with the UNFCCC principles 4, to take prompt action to
reduce the causes of climate change, adapt to its impacts and ensure that the issue is
included in all relevant national and international strategies. As national science
academies, we commit to working with governments to help develop and implement the
national and international response to the challenge of climate change.
G8 nations have been responsible for much of the past greenhouse gas emissions. As
parties to the UNFCCC, G8 nations are committed to showing leadership in addressing
climate change and assisting developing nations to meet the challenges of adaptation and
mitigation.
We call on world leaders, including those meeting at the Gleneagles G8 Summit in July
2005, to:
* Acknowledge that the threat of climate change is clear and increasing.
* Launch an international study5 to explore scientifically informed targets for
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, and their associated emissions
scenarios, that will enable nations to avoid impacts deemed unacceptable.
* Identify cost-effective steps that can be taken now to contribute to substantial and
long-term reduction in net global greenhouse gas emissions. Recognise that
delayed action will increase the risk of adverse environmental effects and will
likely incur a greater cost.
· Work with developing nations to build a scientific and technological capacity best
suited to their circumstances, enabling them to develop innovative solutions to
mitigate and adapt to the adverse effects of climate change, while explicitly
recognising their legitimate development rights.
* Show leadership in developing and deploying clean energy technologies and
approaches to energy efficiency, and share this knowledge with all other nations.
* Mobilise the science and technology community to enhance research and
development efforts, which can better inform climate change decisions.
Notes and references
1. This statement concentrates on climate change associated with global warming. We use the
UNFCCC definition of climate change, which is 'a change of climate which is attributed directly
or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is
in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods'.
2. IPCC (2001). Third Assessment Report. We recognise the international scientific consensus of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
3. IEA (2004). World Energy Outlook 4. Although long-term projections of future world energy
demand and supply are highly uncertain, the World Energy Outlook produced by the International
Energy Agency (lEA) is a useful source of information about possible future energy scenarios.
4. With special emphasis on the first principle of the UNFCCC, which states: 'The Parties should
protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the
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basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in
combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof'.
5. Recognising and building on the IPCC's ongoing work on emission scenarios.
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